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Administrative agencies rely heavily on the foundational legal mechanisms of the 
administrative state – rulemaking, licensing, and enforcement adjudication – to pursue their 
statutory objectives.  These foundational mechanisms differ from each other in critical ways, 
including the applicable procedures (and the participatory rights that accompany them), the legal 
effect of their use, and the nature and extent of oversight (including judicial oversight) that 
accompany their use.  As a result, an agency’s choice of which mechanism(s) to use to 
implement its statutory mission has significant impacts on key legitimizing features and values 
of the administrative state.   
 
Despite its importance, agency mechanism choice occurs largely in the shadows of the 
administrative state.  Congress typically gives agencies considerable autonomy to choose among 
legal mechanisms, and none of the three branches whose actions legitimize agency action pays 
much attention to how agencies make those choices.  Scholars’ traditional conception of 
“canonical administrative law” similarly has generally given short shrift to agency mechanism 
choice.  This neglect is a prominent example of the symptomatic lack of attention to what some 
have referred to as internal administrative law. 
 
This Article helps to fill this gap in the literature through an empirical case study of how 
one agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has used regulations, permitting, 
and enforcement adjudication to reform its enforcement program through implementation of an 
initiative called “Next Generation Compliance” (Next Gen).  The case study demonstrates that at 
least five variables have influenced EPA’s agency mechanism choices to advance Next Gen – the 
key actors that participate in programmatic design and implementation (both within and outside 
the agency), the agency’s goals, the governance tools at its disposal, its authority under different 
statutory regimes, and what we refer to as “intra-mechanism” features (differences, for example, 
between administrative and judicial enforcement adjudication).  Ours is the first empirical study 
in the law review literature of which we are aware that seeks to unpack an agency’s mechanism 
choices to advance understanding of the choices an agency made, why it made them, and what 
effects those choices had.  Because we examine factors that have not been considered before in 
the literature, the Article holds special promise for significantly extending and enriching our 
understanding of critical factors that influence agency mechanism choice decisions.  The 
provisional assessment of the implications of our findings that we provide should help guide 
policymakers interested in driving agency mechanism choices toward strategies most likely to 




This Article explores questions at the heart of the operation of the federal administrative 
state that relate to agencies’ choice of legal mechanisms to carry out their statutory missions.  
Three types of legal mechanisms – rulemaking, licensing, and enforcement adjudication – are the 
basic legal instruments that administrative agencies use to do their work and pursue their 
statutory objectives.1  The factors that govern agency mechanism choice, and the implications of 
                                                          
1 The administrative law casebooks and treatises highlight the central role these mechanisms play in agency work.  
See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 
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such choices for agencies’ ability to promote the goals of the statutes they administer, are worthy 
of close attention for at least two reasons.  First, agencies would be able to accomplish little 
without recourse to one or more of the three basic mechanisms and the administrative state 
would largely grind to a halt without their use.  It is therefore important to understand the manner 
in which these mechanisms operate and how and why agencies choose among them. 
 
Second, these fundamental building blocks for the operation of the administrative state 
differ from each other in critical ways, including in the procedures agencies must follow in using 
them (and the participatory rights that accompany them), the legal effect of their use, and the 
nature and extent of oversight (including judicial oversight) that accompany their exercise.2  
Because of these significant differences,3 an agency’s choice among available legal mechanisms 
to advance a policy goal has significant implications for fundamental administrative law values 
such as transparency, accountability, participation, deliberation, fairness, and consistency, and 
therefore for the legitimacy of the administrative state.4  Thus, it is incumbent on anyone 
interested in understanding how the administrative state operates, and in assessing its legitimacy, 
to give close attention to an agency’s use of its available legal mechanisms to carry out its 
mission.5    
                                                          
chs. 3-5, 7 (2d ed. 2015); WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13 (3d ed. 2009); JOHN 
F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 546 (2nd ed. 2015); see also Robert L. 
Glicksman & David L. Markell, Unraveling the Administrative State: Mechanism Choice, Key Actors, and 
Regulatory Tools, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 318 (2018) [hereinafter Unraveling]. Agencies also rely on other mechanisms 
to advance their agendas, including nonbinding actions such as guidance documents.  Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal 
Agency Guidance: An Institutional Perspective 4, 7 (Admin. Conf. of the United States, Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/parrillo-agency-guidance-final-report.pdf (stating that 
“[g]uidance . . . is a ubiquitous and essential feature of countless agency programs,” and noting that guidance is 
“conventionally said to be nonbinding”).  The debate about the binding character of guidance is longstanding and we 
do not address it here.  The Trump Administration has mandated that agencies reduce their reliance on informal 
mechanisms such as guidance documents.  See, e.g., Memorandum for All Components from the Attorney General, 
Prohibition on Improper Guidance Documents (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1012271/download.     
2 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Forum, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2004) (pointing out 
that “[t]he agency’s choice among these policymaking forms matters because . . . each is distinct” in terms of the 
three factors cited in the text). The third variable, judicial oversight, may be further unpacked into two sub-parts – 
whether and when agency action is judicially reviewable and the standard of review a court will use when review is 
available.  Id. at 1396. 
3 Differences between legal mechanisms can be overstated.  See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th 
Cir. 1973) (considering whether an agency should have used adjudication rather than rulemaking in a particular 
situation); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1965) [hereinafter Shapiro, Choice] (noting that it is not always easy to 
distinguish between rulemaking and adjudication). 
4  Magill, supra note 2, at 1396 (noting that “the agency makes an important choice when it selects the policymaking 
form its action will take”).  The concept of governmental (and particularly agency) legitimacy has received 
considerable treatment.  See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV.  69, 86 (1959) (“Legitimacy involves the 
capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate or proper ones for the society.”); Emily Hammond & David Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial 
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 316 (2013).  See generally Jeremy 
Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718 (2016).   
5 There is often a significant interaction between the mechanisms.  For example, an unclear rule may complicate 
subsequent enforcement or permitting efforts.  See. e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 110-111 




Despite the significant implications that accompany mechanism choice, agencies enjoy 
broad autonomy to decide how to use the ones that are available to them to implement the 
statutes they administer.  They are constrained only by very limited ex ante direction (e.g., 
through statutory provisions defining the parameters of delegated discretionary authority or 
budgeting) or ex post scrutiny (e.g., through oversight) from the three branches of government 
whose oversight is critical to ensuring agency accountability.  Congress typically gives agencies 
considerable autonomy to choose among legal mechanisms.6  The Executive rarely intervenes in 
agency mechanism choice.  Although it has the potential indirectly to influence mechanism 
choice, the limited direction provided by presidential oversight of agency rulemaking conducted 
by the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) by its terms is focused on the merits (or demerits) of particular rules, not on the 
underlying choice of rulemaking as the vehicle through which to pursue statutory goals.7  The 
courts, often characterized as the legitimizer of agency action through review of its validity,8 
have traditionally shown little interest in assessing agency mechanism choice or directing 
agencies to use one mechanism rather than another.9  As Elizabeth Magill observes, “the judicial 
reaction [to an agency’s choice of mechanisms] can be simply described:  hands-off.  An agency 
can choose among its available policymaking tools and a court will not require it to provide an 
explanation for its choice.”10  She concludes that agency choice of policymaking form is “not 
now considered worthy of notice.”11  Taking advantage of this largely hands off posture from the 
                                                          
(revised ed. 2012) (noting that unclear rules “come[] home to roost when the Agency tries to write a permit or take 
an enforcement action”). 
6 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974) (emphasizing the National 
Labor Relations Board’s broad discretion under the National Labor Relations Act to adopt policy either through 
rulemaking or adjudication); but cf. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 158 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(narrowly construing the scope of the NLRB’s rulemaking authority).  See generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.9, at 502 (5th ed. 2010) (“Most agency-administered statutes . . . leav[e] the 
agency with discretion to choose any combination of rulemaking and adjudication it prefers.”).   
 At a more nuanced level, each mechanism comes in various shapes and sizes, and agencies often have the 
freedom to decide how best to employ a particular mechanism. See. e.g., Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power 
Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014) 
(analyzing the flexibility agencies may have in permitting, including the discretion to issue general permits by rule 
or to permit on a case-by-case basis). 
7 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) (discussing OIRA’s 
role). 
8 Hammond & Markell, supra note 4, at 314. 
9 See, e.g., Whitman v. Amer. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting claim that broad delegation of 
authority to EPA to adopt air quality standards violated the nondelegation doctrine); Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (recognizing the SEC’s authority to apply newly adopted 
standards in an adjudicatory proceeding). 
10 Magill, supra note 2, at 1385 (emphasis in original); id. at 1384 (also noting that an agency’s “choice about which 
tool [rulemaking or adjudication] to rely on appears, at first glance, to be unregulated by courts”).  Magill notes that 
this approach is inconsistent with the usual judicial requirement “that agencies provide reasoned explanations for 
their discretionary choices.”  Id. at 1385.  Courts nevertheless indirectly influence agency mechanism choices by 
“adjusting the consequences of choosing one form or another – for instance, intensifying the standard of review, 
permitting a party to sue at a particular point, or shaping the procedures that must be followed. . . .” Id.  In the 
enforcement arena, the Supreme Court has famously held that courts have virtually no role in reviewing agency 
decisions about whether to pursue enforcement in particular cases.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
11 Magill, supra note 2, at 1386.  One of the purposes of her article was to begin to “notice” such choices. Id.  The 
limited judicial attention to agency mechanism choice undoubtedly contributes to the lack of scholarly attention.  
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three branches, agencies have “gone about their business” of using the diverse set of 
policymaking mechanisms at their disposal in “varying ways.”12 
 
A significant challenge for those interested in these dynamics is that agency mechanism 
choice occurs largely in the shadows of the administrative state, despite its importance.  Perhaps 
as a result, scholars’ traditional, narrow conception of “canonical administrative law” has 
typically given short shrift to agency mechanism choice.13  The two principal questions we 
address in this Article are meant to shed new light on this critical feature of agency 
decisionmaking. First, we assess what mix of mechanisms the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) used in implementing a novel enforcement and compliance promotion initiative.14  
Second, we explore why agencies chose one mechanism rather than another and what factors 
influenced those choices.  The limited analysis of this second question that appears in the 
literature more generally has largely focused on a few key features of rulemaking and 
adjudication.  These include the potential of different mechanisms to influence the scope, cost 
effectiveness, consistency, accessibility, flexibility, responsiveness, and capacity to address 
uncertainty of regulatory initiatives.  The scholarly literature suggests that agencies’ choice of 
mechanism is likely to be heavily influenced by those features.15   
 
We believe that agency mechanism choice is influenced by a more complicated set of 
factors and relationships than is commonly appreciated.  At least five interrelated aspects of 
regulatory design are critical to achieving regulatory goals, and all of these likely bear on 
mechanism choice.16  The first involves the manner in which different actors that participate (or 
                                                          
12 Id. at 1384; Shapiro, Choice, supra note 3, at 921 (noting that agency flexibility to choose among mechanisms “is 
not . . . an unmixed blessing”).  Professor Shapiro also observes that the “[t]he problem of choice . . . is one 
confronting practically every agency. . . .”  Id. at 923.   
13 See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 
62 (2015) (defining “canonical” administrative law, which “occupies the largest and most prominent positions in 
treatises and the casebooks,” as “largely concerned with the role of the courts (1) in policing administrative 
rulemaking and formal adjudication and (2) in enforcing agency compliance with statutes and their own rules”); 
David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 236 (2010) (arguing that “administrative law 
conventionally understood misses a great swath of actual administration”).  We suggest that administrative law’s 
reach, and the focus of administrative law scholarship, should extend well beyond the role of the courts to 
encompass internal agency operations and the other key elements of policy design, such as those we discuss here.  
The literature’s lack of consideration of mechanism choice is a prominent, and critical, example of the symptomatic 
lack of attention to what other scholars have referred to as “internal administrative law.” See Gillian E. Metzger & 
Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017).   
14 In this Article, we use “EPA” as an umbrella term for both EPA and analogous state-level environmental 
enforcement.  See note 42, infra. 
15 We review this literature, and explore the theoretical benefits and disadvantages of these two mechanisms, in a 
previous Article.  See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 328-49.  For a relatively early review of an agency’s choice 
between rulemaking and adjudication, see Shapiro, Choice, supra note 3, at 929-42 (offering several reasons why 
agencies ought to use rulemaking more than was occurring at that time); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE 
JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 7 (2010) (noting that “little work 
investigates the origins of private and public actors’ preferences in public law”). 
16 See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 335-49 (identifying and elaborating on each of these features of effective 
governance).  Our five components are not intended to be exclusive.  For example, budgetary resources shape 
agency mechanism choice.  See, e.g., Jeremy Remy Nash, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Production Function of 
the Regulatory State: How Much Do Agency Budgets Matter, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695 (2017); Eloise Pasachoff, 
Controlling Agencies through the President’s Budget Process, ADMIN & REG. L. NEWS 8 (Winter 2018); cf.  U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office, Federal Regulations: Key Considerations for Agency Design and Enforcement 
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have the potential to participate) in the implementation of regulatory programs may influence 
mechanism choice.  These include actors internal to the agency, other federal actors, other 
government actors (especially in cooperative federalism systems such as those that the nation’s 
environmental regulatory schemes employ),17 regulated entities, and regulatory beneficiaries.  
Second, the goals an agency is supposed to achieve under its authorizing legislation have the 
potential to influence mechanism choice.  Third, we consider governance tools that may be 
available for use by different regulatory actors, which will necessarily differ in varying 
regulatory contexts.  Fourth, the scope of an agency’s statutory authority (and the constraints 
imposed on its exercise) can narrow or expand the range of mechanism choices available to the 
agency and the relative attractiveness of these mechanisms.  Finally, a series of what we refer to 
as “intra-mechanism features” form part of the decisionmaking calculus. 
 
Our contention is that both regulatory effectiveness and legitimacy are influenced by an 
agency’s mechanism choices and the factors that influence them.  Figure 1 below depicts the 
factors that the traditional scholarship tends to highlight in considering why agencies use 
particular legal mechanisms to pursue their policy agendas, and the additional factors that we 
believe deserve closer attention. 
 
Figure 1 
An Expanded Array of Factors that Influence Agency Mechanism Choice 
 
 
                                                          
Decisions, GAO-18-22 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687875.pdf (identifying key elements of regulatory 
design, including (1) regulatory objectives; (2) options for achieving them; (3) potential effectiveness; (4) risks 
associated with each option; (5) enforcement implications; and (6) performance evaluation).  See also David L. 
Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 618 
n.272 (2016) [hereinafter Dynamic Governance] (identifying other efforts to explore elements of policy design).   
17 Under most of the federal pollution control statutes, Congress has carved out a significant role for state 
participation.  The allocation of authority between the federal government and the states under these laws is often 
described as a form of “cooperative federalism.”  States play an especially significant role in permitting and 
enforcement, two of the three mechanisms that are the focus of this Article.  See Robert L. Glicksman, From 
Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 719, 727-54 (2006); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our 
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. 
REV. 347, 353-54 (1994). 





A framework of this kind extends beyond the limited scope of most treatments of mechanism 
choice in the literature. 
 
To test the value of our conceptual framework, we conducted an empirical study that 
tracks an agency’s actual mechanism choices as it sought to advance a specific initiative.18  We 
reviewed an effort by EPA to transform how it enforces and seeks to improve compliance with 
the environmental laws it administers.  Acknowledging significant shortcomings in the agency’s 
efforts in this arena,19 in 2013 EPA leaders launched the agency’s Next Generation Compliance 
(Next Gen) initiative because of their judgment that “pollution challenges require a modern 
approach to compliance, taking advantage of new tools and approaches while strengthening 
vigorous enforcement of environmental laws.”20  While Next Gen itself concluded as a discrete 
                                                          
18 Our previous work, Unraveling, supra note 1, supplies the theoretical foundation for the conceptual framework 
we apply here for improving regulatory governance.  This Article supplies empirical analysis of how EPA has 
actually implemented a novel initiative to enhance compliance with regulatory duties and the extent to and manner 
in which each of the factors in our framework has influenced that initiative. 
19 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-115, Environmental Protection: EPA Should Develop a Strategic 
Plan for Its New Compliance Initiative 1 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650711.pdf [hereinafter GAO-13-
115] (noting that EPA has reported that it is not achieving anticipated environmental and public health benefits 
because of substantial noncompliance rates in some programs); David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic 
Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 45, 63-64 (2014) [hereinafter Holistic] (quoting EPA 
Administrator’s acknowledgment  that the agency’s clean water enforcement programs were ineffective and that 
noncompliance levels were unacceptably high); Dynamic Governance supra note 16, at 586, 591-92, 594 (discussing 
information deficiencies, shortcomings in coordination and effectuation by states, and inadequate resources).  
20 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30 ENVTL. F. 22, 22 (Sept.–Oct. 2013) [hereinafter Giles, NGC] 
(noting that EPA launched Next Gen because of the need for dramatic change).  According to Giles, who was then 
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initiative in fiscal year 2017, “many of the tools and approaches continue to be relevant and 
useful,” as EPA has noted.21 As a result, our findings continue to be relevant to EPA’s 
enforcement-related mechanism choices.  Moreover, and more importantly, our findings provide 
critical insights into the factors that influence mechanism choice that are relevant to similar 
choices by other agencies.  We believe that our framework, and the analysis of its application to 
Next Gen, can provide valuable assistance to any agency as it considers which of the 
mechanisms available to it are likely to be best suited to achieving regulatory goals, and to those 
overseeing agency mechanism choices and scholars reviewing their efficacy. 
 
The vision behind EPA’s commitment to Next Gen was that it could improve 
enforcement, and compliance more generally, by advancing five objectives, some of which took 
advantage of dramatic developments in technological capacity:  (1) increased deployment of 
advanced monitoring, to improve detection of pollution generally and legal violations in 
particular; (2) greater transparency, to expand the accessibility of salient compliance-related 
information; (3) electronic reporting (e-reporting), to streamline and improve the gathering and 
dissemination of compliance-related information; (4) use of innovative enforcement strategies, 
such as third-party monitoring, to improve understanding of compliance concerns and incentivize 
actions to address them; and (5) clearer rules that make compliance easier (what EPA has 
referred to as “compliance built-in”).22   
 
Our findings validate the conceptual framework for analyzing mechanism choice 
reflected in Figure 1 by showing a relationship between EPA’s mechanism choices and each of 
the variables in that framework.  In particular, we find a relationship (which in many cases is 
statistically significant) between EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms and each of the other aspects 
of regulatory design in our conceptual framework.  We explore whether the identity of the actors 
involved affects EPA’s use of the different mechanisms.  Here, we evaluate the possible impact 
on mechanism choice of the involvement of different EPA officials and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).23  In addition, given that EPA issues permits to and pursues enforcement actions 
                                                          
the head of EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), Next Gen would “mov[e] our 
compliance programs into the 21st century.”  Id.  Next Gen was also motivated by resource shortages.  See U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE: STRATEGIC PLAN 2014-2017, 3-7 (2014), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/next-gen-compliance-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf 
[hereinafter EPA, NGC 2014-2017] (“Budget uncertainties and constrained resources only reinforce the imperative 
to move forward with Next Generation Compliance.”); EPA Official: ‘Next Generation’ Improving Compliance, 47 
ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1742 (2016) (quoting EPA official acknowledging limited inspection resources).  For more on 
the genesis and components of Next Gen, see Dynamic Governance, supra, note 16, at 610; David L. Markell & 
Robert L. Glicksman, Next Generation Compliance, 30-Winter NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 22, 22 (2016).   
21 See U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/next-generation-compliance (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2019). 
22 Cynthia Giles, NGC, supra note 20, at 22; Christina Baptista, Next Generation Compliance: EPA embraces 
technology and transparency to promote compliance with environmental laws, TRENDS, Jul.-Aug. 2016, at 10, 11 
(characterizing rules with compliance built in as “designing rules and permits that are clear, easy to implement, and 
contain self-reinforcing drivers, such as third-party verification”). 
23 We also would like to have reviewed the impacts of actors’ roles in ways the data available to us did not allow.  
For example, states play a critical role in environmental regulation, and we hoped to consider consistencies and 
differences between and among states, but we lacked enough data about state involvement.  See, e.g., Office of 
Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools: A User's Guide, OTA-ENV-634 130-31, at 591-94 
(1995), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9517.pdf [hereinafter OTA User’s Guide] (discussing limited data on state 
performance).  Our empirical results suggest that the challenge of understanding state activity qualifies as an 
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against both municipal and industrial parties, we evaluate whether the identity of the regulated 
party affects how EPA has used these two mechanisms. 
 
Second, we assess whether EPA uses its legal mechanisms differently to advance its 
objectives – for example, whether it uses rulemaking more to advance one goal, such as 
expanding e-reporting, while using enforcement to advance a different objective, such as 
increased use of advanced monitoring.  As far as we know, no one has tried to connect an 
agency’s use of particular mechanisms to the use of particular regulatory tools and the 
achievement of specific objectives in this way.24   
 
Third, we evaluate whether statutory authority might affect mechanism choice.  Here, we 
test whether EPA’s use of mechanisms is consistent across statutory authorities, or whether 
mechanism use varies depending on the statute involved.  We found, for example, that EPA used 
a different mix of mechanisms to enforce and foster improved compliance with different organic 
statutes (e.g., more enforcement settlements and fewer regulation and permitting actions under 
some statutes than others). 
 
Finally, moving to a more nuanced level of analysis, we assess the impact on EPA 
mechanism choice of “intra-mechanism” differences.  For example, in some enforcement cases 
EPA includes a Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) as a “beyond compliance” strategy to 
commit an alleged violator to agree to certain types of injunctive relief, while in others it does 
not.  We evaluate the impact of this intra-mechanism variation on other factors, such as the types 
of objectives EPA sought to achieve, and the types of defendants involved in the cases.25  The 
empirical findings in Part II of this Article support our hypothesis that more factors than those 
that are the focus of the conventional administrative law literature affect mechanism choice. 
 
In short, we consider mechanism choice from the perspective of not only features of the 
mechanisms themselves, but also taking into account the intersection of the use of different legal 
mechanisms with the other key features of administrative governance we identify above – the 
actors, objectives, tools, statutory authority, and more subtle “intra-mechanism features.”26  This 
analysis enriches understanding of the different dimensions that influence agency mechanism 
                                                          
Achilles heel for those interested in truly grappling with the workings of the administrative state.  Similarly, 
significant regional differences exist within EPA, but data on regional participation in Next Gen is limited.  While 
we offer a few observations about regional differences, this is another area that holds promise for additional 
research.   
24 While EPA identified five objectives in its Next Gen initiative, other objectives or strategies are possible, too.  
See, e.g., OTA User’s Guide, supra note 23 (considering options for regulatory reform and innovation); U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Federal Regulations: Key Considerations for Agency Design and Enforcement 
Decisions, GAO-18-22 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687875.pdf (discussing strategies such as relatively 
flexible performance designs that “establish an outcome but allow flexibility in how to achieve it,” more prescriptive 
design-based regulations that “specify “a certain technology, and compliance assistance). 
25 See infra Part IIB.8. 
26 Brian Galle has suggested that “[g]overning in the twenty-first century . . . is a problem of incentive design.  
Regulators often know what they want, but not how best to achieve it.”  Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante 
Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2017).  Mechanism choice is one dimension of this challenge.  Our 
conceptual framework, supported by our empirical findings, reinforces the complexity of the challenge.  Our study 
reveals other challenges to effective governance as well, including challenges due to less-than-complete data, and 
significant coordination barriers.  
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choice and paves the way for further research aimed at increasing understanding of these 
dimensions and their implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of regulatory governance.     
 
Part II of the Article provides our case study of EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms to 
implement Next Gen.  After explaining our methodology, this Part provides our findings 
concerning how EPA used the legal mechanisms available to it to implement Next Gen.  It shows 
the significant relationship between EPA’s choice of mechanisms to advance Next Gen and the 
variables we identify in our conceptual framework. 
 
In Part III we consider possible motivations for EPA’s mechanism choices, in an effort to 
explain why EPA made the decisions it did.  Further, we explain why it is important to 
understand what drives agency mechanism choice because of its implications for core values of 
the administrative state such as transparency, accountability, participation, deliberation, 
effectiveness, and efficiency. 
 
Part IV concludes by highlighting that the fundamental value of this project lies in the 
importance of the questions it raises even more than in the specific answers available at this point 
to explain EPA’s actions in its implementation of Next Gen.  Although the components of other 
regulatory programs will differ from the use of EPA’s enforcement and compliance-related 
authorities, our study of Next Gen provides a template (or at least a starting point) for similar 
analysis of mechanism choice in other regulatory contexts.27  
 
II. A Case Study of EPA’s Use of Legal Mechanisms in a Novel Enforcement and 
Compliance Venture 
 
This Part explains our methodology in identifying legal mechanisms (rules, enforcement 
settlements, and permits) that EPA or a state has used to advance EPA’s Next Gen initiative.  It 
then details how EPA and the states have used these mechanisms to advance Next Gen.   
 
 A.  Methodology 
 
 We identified 130 instances in which EPA or a state used enforcement, rulemaking, or 
permitting to advance Next Gen objectives – 87 enforcement settlements, 26 regulations, and 17 
permits.28  EPA posted 84 of the 87 settlements in a series of eight compilations of Next Gen 
                                                          
27 We agree with the cautionary note expressed by Professors Farber and O’Connell about the importance of 
context.  See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public Choice and 
Public Law, in FARBER & O’CONNELL, supra note 15, at 8-9 (recommending that “any normative analysis should be 
particularized to specific institutional arrangements and actors…. [W]e should be wary of normative 
recommendations that fail to pay close attention to context.”); cf. Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in id. at 345 
(“the best public choice scholarship shows that global claims about the normative status of delegation are 
nonsensical.  Evaluation must be localized and sensitive to the institutional variation . . . . ”). 
28 We refer to these 130 instances as “instruments” throughout this Article.  On December 30, 2018, we ran a search 
with the terms “Next Generation” /s enforcement compliance in the following databases:  All States (Cases), EPA 
Title V Final Orders, EPA Regional Decisions, EPA Environmental Appeals Board, and APA Administrative Law 
Judge Decisions.  This search turned up no relevant documents.  We also searched the All Federal (Cases) database 
using the terms EPA and “Next Generation” and turned up no relevant decisions.   
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activity that it issued beginning in 2015.29  We identified three additional settlements that include 
Next Gen features through our own research.30  EPA has posted five compendia that list legal 
                                                          
29  EPA designates four of these as “Settlement Highlights” for Next Gen.  These four lists only include settlements 
that incorporate Next Gen features, and do not include permits or regulations.  The lists include settlements under 
the range of statutes EPA administers.  U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance: Enforcement Settlement Highlights 
(last edited Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/nextgen-
enfsettlementhighlights.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Highlights, Jan. 2015]; U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance: 
Enforcement Settlement Highlights (last edited May 23, 2016 ) [hereinafter Settlement Highlights, May 2016]; U.S. 
EPA, Next Generation Compliance: Enforcement Settlement Highlights (last edited Sept. 8, 2016) [hereinafter 
Settlement Highlights, Sept. 2016]; U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance: Enforcement Settlement Highlights 
(last edited  December 20, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/nextgen-
enfsettlementhighlights.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Highlights, Dec. 2016]. 
The other four compilations are statute-based.  Each lists the suite of Next Gen enforcement settlements, 
permits, and regulations undertaken under a particular statute.  Two of the compilations list Next Gen matters under 
the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, Appendix to NPDES Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples (last 
edited Sept. 29, 2015) [hereinafter NPDES 2015 Compendium Appendix]; U.S. EPA, NPDES Compendium of Next 
Generation Compliance Examples (last edited Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
06/documents/npdesnextgencomplcompendium.pdf [hereinafter NPDES 2016 Compendium];  U.S. EPA, Appendix 
to NPDES Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples (last edited Sept. 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/npdesnextgencomplcompendium-appendix.pdf 
[hereinafter NPDES 2016 Compendium Appendix].  A third compilation is for Next Gen activity under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), U.S. EPA, RCRA Compendium of Next Generation Compliance 
Examples (last edited Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
09/documents/rcranextgencomplcompendium.pdf [hereinafter RCRA Compendium]; U.S. EPA, Appendix to RCRA 
Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples (last edited Sept. 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/rcranextgencomplcompendium-appendix.pdf; 
[hereinafter RCRA Compendium Appendix].  The fourth compilation is for such activity under the Clean Air Act.  
U.S. EPA, Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples in Clean Air Act Programs (last edited Sept. 
2016 ), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/caanextgencomplcompendium.pdf 
[hereinafter CAA Compendium]; U.S. EPA, Appendix to Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples in 
Clear [sic] Air Act Programs (last edited Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
09/documents/caanextgencomplcompendium-appendix.pdf; [hereinafter CAA Compendium Appendix]. 
In reviewing EPA’s compilations, we noted that six settlements appear on earlier lists but not on later lists: 
In the Matter of Wilcox Farms, Inc.; Alpha Natural Resources; City of Fall River; CITGO; U.S. v. Titanium Metals 
Corp., U.S. v. Roquette America.  We included these six in our data base based on our understanding that EPA 
believes the six continue to qualify as Next Gen settlements.  Jon Silberman, Feb. 8, 2017 e-mail to David Markell.    
We also reviewed two articles that EPA officials have published concerning Next Gen, neither of which identified 
any settlements not included on one of EPA’s eight lists.  Giles, NGC, supra note 16; David A. Hindin & Jon D. 
Silberman, Designing More Effective Rules and Permits, 7 GEO. WASH. J. U. J. ENERGY & ENV'T 103 (2016).       
30 EPA is clear in its compilations that its lists are “illustrative, not exhaustive.”  See, e.g., Settlement Highlights, 
Dec. 2016, supra note 29; Silberman email, supra note 29.  We conducted searches for additional Next Gen 
settlements in three EPA websites, through January 31, 2017:  EPA.gov, ECHO Enforcement Case Search 
https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search?srch=adv, and EPA Enforcement Civil Cases and 
Settlements, https://cfpub.epa.gov/enforcement/cases/.  We searched the EPA databases using “Next Generation” 
and “Next Gen” to see if any summaries or press releases specifically used this terminology.  We also searched 
Westlaw and Bloomberglaw’s dockets using search terms “next gen!,” “advanced monitoring,” “e-reporting,” and 
variations of these terms.  We are grateful to Katie Miller, reference librarian, Florida State University College of 
Law, for conducting these searches.  The three settlements we discovered through this series of searches involve 
U.S. v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., Consent Decree, (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/enrd/pages/attachments/2015/05/11/tonawanda_consent_decree_with_app
endices.pdf; U.S. v. HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing LLC., Consent Decree (1:15-cv-02024) (D.C. Dist. Nov. 
19, 2015); U.S. & The Commonwealth of PA, Dept. of Env. Prot. v. DE County Reg. Water Quality Control 
Authority (DELCORA) Consent Decree, (E.D.P.A. Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/delaware-
county-regional-water-quality-control-authority-clean-water-act-settlement.  The EPA press releases and summaries 
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mechanisms that include Next Gen features, two for actions under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA),31 a third for actions under the Clean Air Act (CAA),32 a fourth for actions under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),33 and a fifth for actions under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), RCRA, 
and state clean-up authorities.34  These Compendia provided the starting point for our effort to 
identify rules that advance Next Gen ideas, listing a total of twelve rules that include Next Gen 
features.  Of those, nine are state regulations.35  We identified an additional fourteen federal 
regulations that include Next Gen features through a search of the Federal Register, and 
additional legal research.36  EPA’s five statute-specific Compendia identified 17 permits that use 
Next Gen tools.37 
                                                          
announcing the HollyFrontier and DELCORA settlements specifically reference the Next Gen character of the 
settlements.  https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-news-release-us-settles-gasoline-refiner-reduce-emissions-
utah-facility; https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/delaware-county-regional-water-quality-control-authority-clean-
water-act-settlement#nextgen.  We determined that the Tonawanda Coke settlement included Next Gen features 
based on our review of John Haerzfeld, Tonawanda Coke Agrees to Pay $12 Million in Civil Case, Brings Total to 
$42 Million, 46 ENV’T REP. 1470 (May 15, 2015) (describing the third-party auditing features as consistent with 
Next Generation enforcement).  While our database includes more Next Gen settlements than EPA has posted in its 
compilations, we recognize that we may not have found them all.    
31  NPDES Compendium, Sept. 2015, supra note 29; NPDES Compendium, Sept. 2016, supra note 29. 
32  Clean Air Act Compendium, supra note 29. 
33 RCRA Compendium, supra note 29.  These statutes are the major federal pollution control regulatory statutes. 
34 U.S. EPA, Next Generation Cleanup Compendium of Examples (last edited Sept. 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents/cleanupnextgencomplcompendium.pdf.   
35 The affected states are California, Connecticut, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
and Oregon. All but the Colorado, California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey regulations are listed in the NDPES 
Compendium & Annex.  The Colorado regulation is listed in the RCRA Compendium and Appendix, and the other 
three states’ regulations are listed in the Cleanup Compendium.   
36  To find the rules and regulations with Next Gen features, first we reviewed each of the following documents:  
Next Generation Cleanup Compendium of Examples, supra note 29; Settlement Highlights, Dec. 2016, supra note 
29; Clean Air Compendium, supra note 19; Clean Air Compendium Appendix, supra note 29;  RCRA Compendium 
supra note 29;  RCRA Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; NPDES 2016 Compendium, supra note 29; NPDES 
2015 Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; NPDES 2016 Compendium, supra note 29.  We also referred to Giles, 
NGC supra note 20; Hindin & Silberman, supra note 29; and Dynamic Governance, supra note 29.  We searched 
the following websites:  federalregister.gov, epa.gov (including EPA’s nascent (beta stage) “Professional Search” 
function”), nepis.gov.epa, fdsys.gov, ecfr.gov, and reginfo.gov using each of the following terms: “Next Gen,” 
“Next Generation,” “fence line,” “fenceline,” “fence-line,” “emissions,” enhanced monitoring,” “advanced 
monitoring,” “e-reporting,” and “electronic reporting.”  In addition, we searched Westlaw’s Administrative 
Decisions Environmental Protection Agency materials for one of the foregoing terms occurring within the same 
document as rul!, regul!, or settl! (where ! represents all letters after the root of the searched term, thereby capturing 
all variations).  Further, we searched the Federal Digital System (www.gpo.gov/fdsys) (currently found at 
https://www.govinfo.gov) and ecfr.gov (electronic version of the Code of Federal Regulation but not the official 
C.F.R.) to provide a cross-check on what we found in the Federal Register.  Barbara Kaplan, Research Librarian, 
Florida State University College of Law, conducted this search and we are grateful for her efforts. We identified 
several proposed rules that incorporate Next Gen tools, but we have only coded the rules that are final. 
Because, according to EPA officials, the Compendia are not intended to provide comprehensive lists of the 
use of the three key legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen goals, we did not expect the Compendia to include all of 
the rules that use Next Gen tools.  See Silberman email, supra note 29.  
37 A member of EPA’s Next Generation Compliance Team advised us to rely on the Compendia for information on 
permits that include Next Gen features.  Christina Baptista, EPA Next Generation Compliance Team, e-mail to 
Katrina M. Miller (Sept. 8, 2016) (noting, in response to an e-mail from Ms. Miller asking if there is a 
comprehensive list of permits that use Next Gen tools, that she did not believe EPA has a comprehensive list of 
permits with Next Gen, and that once the Compendia are available, “you will be able to see what EPA HQ is aware 
of in terms of permits with Next Gen”).  We asked EPA for advice about how best to search EPA databases 




We coded each enforcement settlement, regulation, and permit identified as relevant to 
Next Gen to reflect each instrument’s incorporation of one or more of EPA’s five Next Gen 
tools:  (1) advanced monitoring, (2) e-reporting, (3) transparency, (4) compliance built in, and (5) 
innovative enforcement.38  EPA itself documents the Next Gen features for 25 of the 87 
settlements, and EPA documents the Next Gen features in all of the permits in our database.39  In 
our coding we largely deferred to EPA’s characterizations of these settlements and permits, 
although we conducted our own independent review of these items.  We coded the remaining 
settlements and regulations, for which EPA did not provide any guidance, ourselves.40 
                                                          
including Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) and the Permit Compliance Systems and Integrated 
Compliance Information System (PCS-ICIS) databases for permits that include Next Gen tools.  The ECHO website 
allows users to search facilities to determine compliance with environmental regulations and allows facilities to be 
narrowed by water or air permits. ECHO contains the PCS-ICIS databases, which contain information about 
companies holding National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under the CWA.  EPA 
officials advised us that the agency does not require states to identify Next Gen features in permits, so that its 
databases do not include that information.  See, e.g., Katrina M. Miller e-mail to Catherine Tunis, EPA Next 
Generation Compliance Team (Sept. 8, 2016); Catherine Tunis e-mail to Katrina M. Miller (Sept. 8, 2016) (also 
recommending the Compendia as sources of information about the use of permitting to advance Next Gen tools).  
This sub-total of permits obviously represents an extremely small subset of permits issued by EPA and the states.  
See, e.g., Analyze Trends: State Water Dashboard, http://echo.epa.gov/trends/comparative-maps-dashboards/state-
water-dashboard?state=National&view=activity.  
 We note that, because Next Gen is a relatively new regulatory innovation, and because of the exploratory 
nature of our analysis, our sample sizes are small.  In particular, we note that the sample includes only 17 permits, 
many of them state-issued (as are many of the regulations that we uncovered).  The nature of the sample limits some 
of the empirical analyses that we can perform, and we urge caution in interpreting these exploratory findings. 
38 These are the categories Assistant Administrator Giles used in the article that helped launch Next Gen.  Giles, 
NGC, supra note 20, at 22-24. 
39  Each compendium contains a chart that specifies the Next Gen feature(s) EPA identifies as included in each 
settlement.  NPDES 2015 Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; NPDES 2016 Compendium Appendix, supra note 
29; Clean Air Act Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; RCRA Compendium Appendix, supra note 29.  We coded 
one case, Lynx Enterprise, which was discussed in the text of the RCRA compendium, but was not listed on the 
RCRA compendium appendix.   
40 Coding was conducted by Professors Glicksman and Markell and two law librarians.  A pilot study of inter-coder 
reliability sampled 414 points of agreement or disagreement across approximately 30% of the 130 Next Gen items in 
our database and revealed an inter-coder reliability of 91.30%.  Accounting for chance agreement among coders, the 
Cohen’s Kappa value was 0.83, suggesting no significant reliability problems.  Any coding disagreements were later 
resolved through mutual consultation and cross-checking.  We reviewed the EPA summaries in the agency-posted 
Settlement Highlights and, as necessary, the EPA press release and other materials for which EPA provided links in 
those Highlights.  We coded a settlement as including the “e-reporting” Next Gen tool if the settlement required the 
regulated party to report to EPA electronically, such as by submitting the discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) 
required under the CWA to EPA electronically.  See, e.g. U.S. and State of Maine v. City of Bangor, which requires 
electronic data submission with real-time data on electronic-flow monitoring from all of the City’s significant CSO 
outfalls.  We coded a settlement as including the “transparency” tool if it required the regulated party to post 
information that would be available to the public via a website or otherwise.  See, e.g., In the Matter of: Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., which requires maintaining a hazardous waste electronic database available to all workers to help 
identify hazardous wastes.  We only coded a settlement as involving a supplemental environmental project (SEP) if 
the SEP itself required the Next Gen feature.  For example, we coded U.S. v. Total Petroleum Puerto Rico as 
including a SEP because EPA’s settlement highlight states, “Total Petroleum agreed to pay a $426,000 penalty, 
implement compliance measures valued at approximately $1 million, and undertake a $600,000 Supplemental 
Environmental Project (SEP).  Consistent with Next Generation Compliance principles, the injunctive relief requires 
Total Petroleum to install fully-automated electronic release detection monitoring systems at 137 of its facilities with 
USTs.”  We confirmed in the consent decree that this injunctive relief is the SEP.  In contrast, we did not code U.S. 
v. County of Westchester (Westchester Co., NY), as having a SEP because the SEP does not contain any Next Gen 




We coded several additional variables for each instrument in order to evaluate possible 
relationships between use of legal mechanisms by relevant governmental actors and other 
features of our conceptual framework.  We coded the regulatory program(s) in play for each 
mechanism to assess whether there are variations in how legal mechanisms implement regulatory 
policy objectives (Next Gen tool advancement) under different statutes (in the vast majority of 
cases, settlements were negotiated under the CAA, CWA, or RCRA).41  For enforcement 
settlements, we coded the government actors involved in each settlement (EPA, in some cases 
DOJ, and in some cases specific EPA Regions) in an effort to explore whether the identity of 
these actors influences policy implementation (here, incorporation of Next Gen tools in 
settlements).  In addition, we coded the identity of the settling party (industrial or municipal).  
We coded permits in the same manner with respect to the identity of the party. 
 
Finally, we included an additional coding item for enforcement settlements to capture 
whether EPA included a SEP.42  As with coding for the particular actors involved in each 
settlement (EPA alone vs. EPA/DOJ, the particular EPA region involved, and identity of the 
defendants), this more nuanced coding makes possible an “intra-mechanism” comparative 
analysis of EPA’s use of different forms of enforcement settlements.43  
 
B.   A Comparative Assessment of the Three Key Legal Mechanisms  
 
 This Section details eight sets of key findings about EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms to 
advance Next Gen that emerged from this study.  These findings are novel for two reasons.  First, 
as indicated above, we have explored factors that have the capacity to influence mechanism 
choice that have not been studied before, at least not in a systematic effort to assess how they 
affect the use of a particular set of agency tools or the pursuit of identified policy objectives.  
Second, we have made a first cut at applying our conceptual framework’s five variables that may 
influence mechanism choice to each of these findings.  Thus, for example, in addition to our 
finding that EPA has used enforcement settlements far more than any other mechanism to 
advance Next Gen (Finding 1), we have provided a provisional explanation for this finding by 
                                                          
features (the SEP involved “(i) increas[ing] the number of days during which unused pharmaceuticals and hazardous 
household chemicals will be accepted from residents of Water District No. 1 at Westchester’s Household Materials 
Recovery Facility or at other designated sites and (ii) . . . purchas[ing] at least $100,000 worth of 55-gallon rain 
barrels for residential collection and storage of roof rainwater runoff, to be distributed to residents of Water District 
No. 1.”  https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-consent-decree-resolving-
westchester-county-s. 
We only coded cases with the “compliance built in” designation if EPA indicated that the case included 
compliance built in.  See https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/memo-nextgen-
useinenfsettlements.pdf (defining each of the tools).   
41 For this reason, we do not analyze instruments created under CERCLA in the remainder of this Article.  We coded 
the date of each settlement to explore whether EPA’s approaches to policy implementation (advancement of Next 
Gen tools) has evolved over time.  We excluded from our analyses use of Next Gen tools that involved more than 
one statute. 
42 See infra note 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of SEPs. 
43 In addition to EPA Next Gen items, our database includes a small number of state-related Next Gen items.  When 
we say “EPA’s” use of Next Gen tools, “EPA” is an umbrella term for both EPA and analogous state-level 
environmental enforcement, unless we have specifically excluded the state items in our database from the analysis. 
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linking it to the five key factors that we believe deserve a closer look for their potential influence 
on mechanism choice.44 
 
 Finding 1.  Relative Use of the Different Legal Mechanisms.  Of the 130 instances in 
which EPA or a state used enforcement, rulemaking, or permitting to advance Next Gen 
objectives, 87 were enforcement settlements, 26 were regulations,45 and 17 were permits, as 
noted above.46  Thus, EPA used enforcement far more than either of the other mechanisms to 
advance its Next Gen objectives.47 
 
Finding 2.  Mean Incorporation of Next Gen Tools Per Instrument.  We did not find a 
meaningful difference in the mean number of Next Gen tools EPA used based on the type of 
instrument involved.48  The mean number of tools used per enforcement settlement was 1.47, 
                                                          
44 We cannot overstate the provisional and tentative nature of this initial effort.  Our explanations are intended to be 
illustrative rather than comprehensive or final.  For example, our data set is limited, especially in the context of 
permitting, given that the number of permits containing Next Gen features is miniscule in relation to the number of 
permits issued each year by EPA and the states under the statutes we studied.  For another, the time period in which 
Next Gen was in effect as an ongoing agency initiative was relatively short, which may have limited the initiative’s 
capacity to filter down from EPA, its creator, to the states, which handle the lion’s share of permitting and 
enforcement actions.  In light of EPA’s statement that it anticipates further use of individual Next Gen components, 
see supra note 21 and accompanying text, the data we explore likely do not comprise the final universe of the use of 
Next Gen tools in rulemaking, permitting, or enforcement.  Finally, we expect others would have filled in the boxes 
in Figure 2 below differently than we have done.  Compiling similar summaries of the relationship between agency 
mechanism use and the features of regulatory design reflected in Figure 1 above requires an understanding of the 
factors that influence mechanism choice that we hope our project will help to foster.  The combination of our 
conceptual framework and case study provide a basis for strengthening that understanding. 
45 EPA has long-embraced rulemaking as a centrally important policymaking mechanism.  GLICKSMAN & LEVY, 
supra note 1, at 267 (“EPA is one of the most prolific sources of regulations . . . .”).  The agency’s track record 
during the time period covered by this case study – proposing 238 rules and finalizing 190 rules between Fall 2013 
and Fall 2016 – reflects its extensive use of this mechanism.  Historical Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaHistory.  [KM, need to use same time period].  From the inception of 
Next Gen, EPA has embraced rulemaking as a critical legal mechanism for advancing Next Gen ideas.  It identifies 
the use of rules as one of the five central elements of the Next Gen initiative.  Giles, NGC, supra note 20, at 22-24. 
46  See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  We used January 31, 2017 as the cut-off date for finding new Next 
Gen cases, rules, or permits.  Our references to Fall 2016 in footnote 45 refer to the EPA’s Unified Agenda, which is 
published only in the fall and spring of each year.  The statistics in the Fall 2016 issue of the Unified Agenda were 
the latest before our January 31, 2017 cut-off date. 
47 During the time period we cover in our study, from January 1, 2013, through January 31, 2017, EPA finalized a 
total of 9,493 civil administrative and judicial cases.  We found these statistics by searching the EPA’s ECHO 
database of enforcement cases, https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search. We searched for civil cases, 
with EPA as the case lead, in which either a final order was entered in a judicial case or a final order was issued in 
an administrative case between January 1, 2013 and January 31, 2017.     
48 Wald (2, N = 130) = 1.15, p = .562.  We analyzed the data using a specialized Poisson regression for “count” data.  
See, e.g., A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA (2d. ed. 2012) 
(providing detailed commentary on the Poisson regression).  This type of regression produces a “Wald value” with 
an associated “p-value,” to determine whether the differences among the count data from specific groups is 
statistically meaningful.  Id.  Wald tests, t-tests, chi-square tests, and F-tests (which are also included in the analyses 
that follow) are all test statistics that yield p-values. 
 Differences between groups are significant if the statistical tests indicate that the likelihood that the 
difference observed would occur by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05).  A difference is 
“marginally significant” if the likelihood of seeing such a difference by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%.  
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 
n.117 (2003) (citing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 
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with a range of 1 to 3. The picture looks much the same for rulemaking (mean of 1.77 tools per 
rule) and permitting (mean of 1.53 tools per permit). EPA typically was quite selective in its 
incorporation of Next Gen objectives into its legal mechanisms.49  Because this finding does not 
suggest that any particular factor was especially salient as an influence on the mean use of tools 
in a particular mechanism, we do not discuss it further. 
 
 Finding 3.  Association of Instrument Identity and Next Gen Objectives Advanced.50  
As Figure 2 indicates, we found that EPA’s use of different Next Gen tools varies significantly 
by mechanism.  In other words, there is a statistically significant interaction between the type of 
legal mechanism used and the likelihood of specific tool usage.51  Table 1 provides the details.  
With settlements, EPA was significantly more likely to use advanced monitoring (used in 66.7% 
of settlements) and transparency (included in 43.7% of settlements) than all other Next Gen tools 
(used in only 15, 12, and 6 percent of settlements).52  For permits, in contrast, EPA was more 
likely to include advanced monitoring, transparency, and e-reporting (as a group, each in the 40-
60 percent range), than innovative enforcement and compliance built in (as a group, each is 
included in less than 6 percent of the permits).53  For regulations, EPA included transparency, 
compliance built-in, and e-reporting regularly (each is included in more than 40 percent of the 
Next Gen rules), more than it has incorporated advanced monitoring or innovative enforcement 
(each less than 25 percent of the time).54  Thus, EPA included advanced monitoring as a 
                                                          
1989)). Because of the small size of our database, we also report “trending” effects, which are not quite marginal. 
We would need more data for those “trending” differences to reach statistical significance, because we lacked the 
statistical power with this data set to claim that they are reliable.  Other researchers may be able to do so with larger 
data sets if Next Gen tools are employed more frequently in the future.  See, e.g., Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power 
Analysis, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 98 (1992).  
49 The choice of whether to include any tools and, if so, which ones, in particular instruments was by no means 
EPA’s alone.  In judicial settlements, DOJ obviously also had a voice on behalf of the government.  For settlements 
generally, the alleged violators’ agreement to incorporation of particular tools was also an indispensable element of 
each of the settlements, and permit applicants similarly potentially had some say.  The question of how much 
EPA/DOJ pushed particular tools in specific situations, and the extent and strength of NGO preferences, deserve 
further attention.  The same is true for permitting. 
50 In this section, we analyzed the presence or absence of particular Next Gen tools via a series of binomial probit 
regressions (with the five Next Gen tools serving as repeated measures, and their presence or absence serving as the 
binary outcome measure, in a mixed design).  We performed these calculations via the Generalized Estimating 
Equations function of the SPSS statistical software.  Where applicable, the models that follow include main effects 
as well as the predicted interaction effect.  For purposes of simplicity, where we have predicted an interactive effect 
in this section, we report only the results of the test for the interaction. 
51 Wald (7, N = 650) = 51.40, p < .001 (interaction effect).  Advanced monitoring was more likely to be used than 
innovative enforcement (95% confidence interval:  0.33, 0.54), e-reporting (0.29, 0.50), transparency (0.01, 0.24), 
and compliance built-in (0.29, 0.50).  Transparency was more likely to be used than innovative enforcement (0.20, 
0.41), e-reporting (0.16, 0.38), and compliance built-in (0.16, 0.38).  We note that our dataset contained, in addition 
to data from EPA, 14 state-level Next Gen items.  None of these items was a settlement, nine were regulations and 
the other five were permits. 
52 Wald (4, N = 435) = 97.08, p < .001 (simple effect).  Advanced monitoring was included in 58 out of 87 
settlements and transparency in 38 out of 87 settlements. Innovative enforcement, compliance built-in, and e-
reporting were included much less often.    
53 Wald (3, N = 85) = 7.86, p = .049 (simple effect).    
54 Wald (4, N = 130) = 12.94, p = .012 (simple effect).  E-Reporting is part of a larger initiative known as E-
Enterprise for the Environment.  See Memorandum from Bob Perciasepe to Assistant Administrators, etc., E-
Reporting Policy Statement for EPA Regulations (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
03/documents/epa-ereporting-policy-statement-2013-09-30.pdf (noting that “[m]oving from paper to electronic 
reporting is a key component of E-Enterprise. . . .”).  EPA has noted that “[w]hile e-reporting reduces paper 
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requirement in over half of Next Gen settlements and permits, but in less than a quarter of 
regulations.  EPA only included e-reporting in 5.7 percent of enforcement settlements, while it 
included e-reporting as a requirement in roughly 40 percent of Next Gen regulations and permits.  
Similarly, EPA rarely included compliance built-in as a requirement in its settlements and 
permits, but compliance built-in tied with transparency as the most prevalent requirement in Next 
Gen regulations.  
 
Figure 2 





Likelihood of Tool Usage (by Mechanism and by Next Gen Tool/Objective) 
 
 Advanced Innovative E-Report Transparency Built-In 
Settlements 66.7 14.9 5.7 43.7 11.5 
Permits 58.8 0.0 41.2 47.1 5.9 
Regulations 23.1 19.2 42.3 46.2 46.2 
 
Our finding that there are statistically significant variations in how an agency used 
different legal mechanisms to advance its objectives supports our hypothesis that there is far 
more to agency mechanism choice than the traditional mechanism-feature factors that scholars 
                                                          
transaction costs associated with creating, mailing, entering, and error correction, it also necessitates new efforts to 
create the necessary tools to assist the regulated source in submitting quality reports and software to accept the 
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have highlighted.55  It appears that not only did mechanism-specific features influence how EPA 
has used different tools to advance Next Gen, but also that differences in the tools themselves 
may have influenced how EPA has used its legal mechanisms to advance the tools.  We are not 
aware of any other effort to assess possible links between an agency’s choice of legal mechanism 
and a particular agency objective, such as EPA’s effort to advance the use of the five Next Gen 
tools.  These findings take us into uncharted waters, at least in the law review literature, and 
reinforce the value of considering a far broader, and more nuanced, set of factors that may 
motivate agency mechanism choice than we have seen in previous analysis. 
 
Finding 4.  Interaction Between the Mechanism Used and the Governing Statute.  This 
finding breaks down EPA’s use of different legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools and 
objectives by using a statutory lens.  Our finding here is that an interaction exists between the 
mechanism used and the governing statute.56  In other words, EPA used the available legal 
mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools differently under the three regulatory statutes that 
provide the legal landscape for Next Gen’s development and implementation, the CAA, CWA, 
and RCRA.  When EPA included a Next Gen tool under the CAA, it was very likely to use an 
enforcement settlement to do so (nearly 73% of the instruments under the CAA were 
settlements).  It was much less likely to use a regulation (only 22.9% of the CAA mechanisms), 
or a permit (only 4.2% of the instruments used).57  EPA used permits and rules more, and 
settlements less, under the CWA in comparison to its use of these mechanisms under the CAA.  
Approximately 56% of the instruments under the CWA were settlements, 31% were permits 
(31.3%), and only 12.5% were rules.58  EPA’s use of mechanisms under RCRA follows a pattern 
that is different in statistically significant ways from its approach under the CAA or CWA.  
Under RCRA, settlements were (again) used the most (66.7%), followed by rules (33.3%).  No 
permits were employed under RCRA (0%) to advance the use of Next Gen tools.59  Thus, while 
                                                          
55 Though we focus here on the relationship between tool selection and mechanism choice, we do not mean to 
exclude the possibility that our other variables (e.g., different preferences by different regulated parties, the 
involvement of DOJ, differences in statutory authority, or intra-mechanism features) may have influenced the 
connection between mechanisms used and tools employed that Finding 3 reflects.  Thus, we have been conservative 
in completing the charts in this Article in positing that particular factors have influenced EPA’s mechanism choices. 
56 Chi-square (4, N = 111) = 20.09, p < .001.  (Fisher’s Exact Test = 17.20, p = .001).  A chi-square analysis 
determines whether two or more proportions are statistically different from one another.  When the proportions 
involve small sample sizes, the “Fisher’s Exact Test” statistic is used instead.  See, e.g., R. A. Fisher, On the 
Interpretation of χ2 from Contingency Tables, and the Calculation of P, 85 J. OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC’Y 87 
(1922).  We excluded from the analysis 19 “hybrid” Next Gen cases that could not be classified as ones that were 
brought solely under the CAA, the CWA, or RCRA.  We therefore evaluated 111 cases in this analysis. 
57 Settlements were more likely to be used under the CAA than were regulations (confidence interval: 0.33, 0.67) 
and permits (confidence interval: 0.55, 0.83).  Regulations were used under the CAA more often than were permits 
(confidence interval: 0.06, 0.32).  We again caution readers in interpreting the absolute percentages reported on 
account of the smaller sample size for permits.  In smaller sample sizes, a one-unit increase or decrease in the 
number of permits will yield a more dramatic increase or decrease in the absolute percentages of permits compared 
to settlements, for example; nonetheless, the statistical tests we employed account for sample size, and the difference 
in proportions across legal mechanisms was statistically significant. 
58 Settlements were more likely to be used under the CWA than were permits (confidence interval: 0.06, 0.44) and 
regulations (0.27, 0.61).  Permits were more likely to be used under the CWA than were regulations (confidence 
interval: 0.03, 0.35). 
59 Settlements were more likely to be used under RCRA than were permits (confidence interval: 0.43, 0.91).  
Regulations were more likely to be used under RCRA than were permits (confidence interval: 0.09, 0.57).  There 
was no statistical difference, however, between the likelihood of the use of settlements and regulations under RCRA 
(confidence interval: -0.01, 0.67).   
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EPA used settlements most frequently under all three statutes, the percentage use of settlements 
was lower under the CWA than under the other two statutes.  In addition, EPA used rules less 
frequently under the CWA than under the other two laws, and EPA’s use of permits differed 
dramatically, comprising nearly a third of the uses of Next Gen tools under the CWA but not at 
all under RCRA.  Figure 3 and Table 3 reflect these differences.  The differences in how EPA 









Next Gen Mechanism % by Governing Statute 
 
 Settlements Permits Regulations 
CAA 72.9 4.2 22.9 
CWA 56.3 31.3 12.5 
RCRA 66.7 0.0 33.3 
 
 We also considered a more fine-grained question: whether EPA used each of its 
mechanisms to advance particular Next Gen tools differently under the statutes and found 
                                                          
60 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (describing differences in the distribution of EPA administrative 
versus judicial settlements under the different statutes (the CAA and RCRA are about 50-50 administrative versus 
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significant differences.61  In other words, we know that EPA uses mostly settlements to advance 
Next Gen under the CAA.  But in those settlements, is EPA more likely to rely on advanced 
monitoring than it is, for example, under the CWA? 
 
 For enforcement settlements, EPA is somewhat more likely to incorporate advanced 
monitoring features into settlements under the CAA than is the case for settlements under the 
CWA and RCRA.62  In contrast, EPA is less likely to incorporate the Next Gen tool of e-
reporting into CAA settlements than is the case for RCRA settlements.63  For rulemaking, the 
only difference in tool usage by statute is the compliance built-in feature,64 which  is less likely 
to be used under the CWA than under the CAA and RCRA.65  We found no general interactive 
effect of statute and tool usage with respect to permits.66  The post-hoc analysis confirmed no 
meaningful differences in tool usage based on statute for permits.67  While EPA’s use of tools 
varies substantially by statute, the small sample size does not allow for any conclusions 
concerning the significance of such differences.  We expect that additional sample data would 
produce significant findings that EPA’s use of particular tools varies by statute. 
 
Figure 4 
Next Gen Tool Usage by Statute (Settlements) 
                                                          
61 Wald (22, N = 555) = 1774.18, p < .001 (significant three-way interaction among relevant statute, legal 
mechanism, and Next Gen tool).  We examined this interaction by examining the pattern of Next Gen tool usage 
under the different statutes first with respect to enforcement settlements, then regulations, and then permits. 
62 Wald (6, N = 360) = 318.32, p < .001 (simple interaction of statute and Next Gen tool); Wald (1, N = 72) = 7.00, p 
= .03 (simple effect of Next Gen tool); Wald (1, N = 72) = 6.73, p = .009 (planned comparison of advanced 
monitoring usage under the CAA and CWA). 
63 Wald (1, N = 72) = 2.98, p = .089 (planned comparison of transparency usage under the CAA and RCRA).  We 
also note that the EPA used the compliance built-in tool under only the CAA. 
64 Wald (1, N = 22) = 4.67, p = .097 (simple effect of Next Gen tool). 
65 For example, B = 1.57, SE = 0.73, Wald (1, N = 22) = 3.00, p = .031 (planned comparison of compliance built-
in under the CAA and the CWA with respect to rulemaking).  We note that the EPA used the advanced 
monitoring tool only under the CAA (and not under CWA or RCRA) with respect to rulemaking. 
66 Because of the small size of our database, we were unable to compute any other calculations with respect to our 
data on permits. 
67 Although not a statistically significant finding in this sample of Next Gen permits, it is worth noting that e-
reporting was required in roughly 30% of permits under the CWA; it was not required under any permits under the 
CAA or RCRA. 






Next Gen Tool Usage by Statute (Settlements) 
 
 Advanced Innovative E-Report Transparency Built-In 
CAA 82.9 20.0 2.9 28.6 17.1 
CWA 51.9 14.8 7.4 59.3 0.0 































Next Gen Tool Usage by Statute (Rulemaking) 
 
 Advanced Innovative E-Report Transparency Built-In 
CAA 45.5 22.7 36.4 36.4 72.7 
CWA 0.0 18.3 33.3 83.3 16.7 
RCRA 0.0 16.7 40.0 60.0 60.0 
 
   
 Finding 5.  The Degree of Consistency Among EPA’s Regions.  To test possible 
variation among EPA’s ten Regions in the use of legal mechanisms, we coded for particular 
Regional involvement in individual settlements and permits.68  As Figure 6 shows, EPA 
Regions’ use of enforcement settlements to advance Next Gen tools has varied, with Regions 2 
and 6 having completed more settlements that include Next Gen tools than the others.69  
Headquarters involvement in such settlements has been relatively significant as well. 
 
Figure 6 
Next Gen Enforcement Settlements by Region (Through January 31, 2017) 
 
                                                          
68 We coded for possible regional variations in implementation of Next Gen because the literature suggests strongly 
that such variations might be expected.  See infra Part III. 
69 Because of the limited extent of regional participation in Next Gen, we have not burrowed more deeply into the 
numbers to explore the possible significance of the differences that exist.  Information about regional consistency (or 
lack thereof) in terms of the questions we ask above (statutes involved, tools involved) and below (type of regulated 
party involved, inclusion of a SEP project) would be worth exploring as Regions do more.  Similarly, it would be 
worthwhile to contextualize the information by situating it in terms of regional enforcement and permitting activity 


























A significant difference also exists in regional use of permitting to advance Next Gen 
tools.  Only a few EPA regions have included Next Gen tools in permits (EPA Regions 1, 6, and 
10), as Table 5 shows.  Thus, based on information supplied by EPA, its efforts to use permitting 
to implement Next Gen appears to vary significantly among EPA Regions.70 
 
Table 5 
Regional Use of Next Gen Tools in Settlements and Permits 
 
 Settlement Permit 
Region 1 8 4 
Region 2 11 0 
Region 3 7 0 
Region 4 6 0 
Region 5 5 0 
Region 6 12 2 
Region 7 7 0 
Region 8 4 0 
Region 9 7 0 
Region 10 7 3 
Multi-Region 13 3 
Total 87 1271 
                                                          
70 See infra note 147 and accompanying text (noting disparities in Regional performance in many areas).  Multi-
regional settlements are national cases that involve a company with facilities in more than one EPA region. These 
are often, but not always, handled out of EPA Headquarters.  See email correspondence between Cynthia Giles and 
Dave Markell, Jan. 25, 2019 (on file with authors). 
71 Five permits were issued by states rather than the EPA, which reduces the total Next Gen permits in this analysis 
from 17 to 12.  The analyses that follow include all 87 settlements and 12 permits, for a sample of 99 cases.  The 

























We further evaluated regional variation to assess whether the regions that are using 
enforcement and/or permitting to advance Next Gen are doing so in similar ways.  We found a 
significant interactive effect between region and likelihood of specific tool usage.72 For example, 
we found differences between regions in their use of advanced monitoring and e-reporting.73  
Our statistical power was too weak to further unpack these differences, but we provide an 
illustrative graph (Figure 7) and chart (Table 6) below.74  Again, even these limited results 
support our hypothesis that factors beyond the traditional explanations for mechanism choice 
may well contribute to inter-regional differences in the use of different tools. 
 
Figure 7 






Regional Differences in the Use of Next Gen Tools (Settlements and Permits)75 
 
                                                          
72 Wald (25, N = 495) = 361.92, p < .001 (interaction effect between mechanism choice and Next Gen tool). 
73 Wald (1, N = 99) = 2431.38, p < .001(simple effect of region on the advanced monitoring tool); Wald (1, 99) = 
1393.07, p < .001 (simple effect of region on the e-reporting tool). 
74 Region 10 might be more likely to use advanced monitoring and e-reporting compared to the other Regions.  It is 
also worth noting that no innovative enforcement mechanisms exist in our database of Next Gen permits, and all 
compliance built-in mechanisms occurred for permits with EPA Headquarters involvement.  Further, the percentages 
in the graph and table that follows do not always add up to 100 percent because state instruments have been omitted. 
75 The figures in this table represent the percentage of Next Gen items in each region that included the specific Next 
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 Advanced Innovative E-Report Transparency Built-In 
Region 1 58.3 08.3 16.7 50.0 16.7 
Region 2 81.8 18.2 09.1 72.7 00.0 
Region 3 57.1 14.3 00.0 42.9 00.0 
Region 4 16.7 16.7 00.0 83.3 00.0 
Region 5 100.0 00.0 00.0 20.0 20.0 
Region 6 85.7 07.1 14.3 42.9 07.1 
Region 7 42.9 42.9 00.0 57.1 00.0 
Region 8 100.0 25.0 00.0 25.0 25.0 
Region 9 42.9 00.0 14.3 42.9 14.3 
Region 10 80.0 00.0 40.0 00.0 10.0 
Multi-Reg. 50.0 18.8 12.5 37.5 25.0 
Average76 64.7 13.1 12.1 39.4 11.1 
 
 
We coded for possible regional variations in implementation of Next Gen because the 
literature suggests strongly that such variations might be expected.  For example, a 2006 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) study concluded that “EPA regions vary substantially 
in the actions they take to enforce environmental requirements.”77  The GAO identified three 
factors that are likely contributors to these regional variations:  (1) philosophical differences 
among regional enforcement staff and between headquarters and regional staff, (2) incomplete 
and unreliable enforcement data, and (3) staffing planning and allocation issues.78 Another 
explanation for headquarters-regional dissonance, offered by Joel Mintz, is that EPA 
Headquarters has failed to clarify its expectations for the Regions or to provide coherent 
guidance.79  Mintz concluded that, in at least some instances, regional enforcement officials 
ignored or failed to follow Headquarters guidance80  One of us has similarly concluded that 
                                                          
76 These averages are weighted according to the sample size for each region. 
77 U.S., Gov’t Accountability Off., Environmental Compliance and Enforcement: EPA’s Efforts to Improve and 
Make More Consistent Its Compliance and Enforcement Activities, GAO-06-840T, at I (2006), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/114303.pdf [hereinafter GAO-06-840T]; see also The State of Environmental Law 
Enforcement: A Speech Presented at the American Bar Association's 1998 Annual Meeting, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10711, 10712 (noting that “there is some difference in [enforcement] emphasis between different EPA Regions”). 
78 GAO-06-840T, supra note 77, at i; cf. id. at 7 (noting that “the considerable autonomy built into EPA’s 
decentralized, multilevel organizational structure allows regional offices considerable latitude in adapting 
headquarters’ direction in a way they believe best suits their jurisdiction.”).  Other GAO reports have reached 
similar conclusions.  See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Major Management Challenges, GAO-11-422T, at 
3 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125556.pdf (characterizing the performance of EPA’s regional offices in 
carrying out their state oversight responsibilities as “generally proven to be inconsistent over the years”).   
79 JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 105-10 (1995) [hereinafter MINTZ 1995]; id.at 116 (discussing the 
need for more direct regional accountability on enforcement matters and differences in the degree of accountability 
between Regions). 
80 Id. at 75-76; cf. Alfred R. Light, Deja Vu All over Again? A Memoir of Superfund Past, 10-Fall NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T  29, 33 (1995) (“Though EPA has published policy guidance [under CERCLA] for its regions for many of 
these settlement tools, many are rarely used,”). 
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“there appears to be fairly widespread disregard by EPA Regions . . . of EPA [headquarters’] 
enforcement policies,”81 probably due in part to the non-binding nature of the relevant guidance 
and policies.82  These challenges83 have periodically led to calls for less regional flexibility and 
more prescriptive direction from Headquarters.84 
 
Finding 6.  The Role of Regulated Parties in Mechanism Choice.  A sixth set of 
findings relates to a different set of critical actors:  regulated parties.85  We coded the 
enforcement settlements to evaluate whether EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms varies depending 
on the identity of the settling party (industrial vs. municipal party), and did the same with respect 
to the identity of the permittee in the permits that include Next Gen tools.  Information about the 
identity of the regulated party is readily accessible in the EPA Next Gen compilations.  As a 
result, it was feasible to undertake this effort to bring a nuanced lens to EPA mechanism choice 
and use through this binary unpacking of the regulated community.   
 
 Figure 8 shows that the identity of the regulated party is associated with the use of 
enforcement and permitting in different ways.  For the period we studied, EPA used its 
mechanisms differently depending on whether the regulated party was an industrial party or a 
municipality.86  In particular, Next Gen settlements were significantly more likely to contain an 
industrial defendant than a municipal defendant.87  The opposite was true with respect to Next 
Gen permits, although the difference did not rise to statistical significance.88 
 
Figure 8 
Use of Next Gen Mechanisms as a Function of the Defendant’s Identity 
                                                          
81 David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a 'Reinvented' State/Federal Relationship: The 
Divide between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.1, 7, 54 n. 223 (2000). 
82 See Ellen R. Zahren, Comment, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping at State Heels to Protect the 
Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 383 (2000) (referring to guidance to regional administrators and states). 
83 For general discussion of the “promise and limitations of regional administrative governance” and a plea for more 
research on federal decentralization and regional governance, see Dave Owen, Regional Administration, 63 UCLA 
L. REV. 58 (2016).  
84 See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, More Consistency Needed Among EPA Regions in Approach To 
Enforcement, RCED-00-108, at 11-12 (2000), www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00108.pdf (concluding that guidance on 
key elements of audit protocols would “engender a higher level of consistency among all [ten] regional offices”). 
85 See infra Part III (discussing why, based on past analysis, we believed there might be differences in mechanism 
choice based on the identity of the regulated party). 
86 Wald (1, N = 104) = 6.98, p = .008 (interaction between mechanism choice and the defendant’s identity).  We 
examined this interaction by looking at the effect of the defendant’s identity in settlements and in permits separately. 
87 Chi-square (1, N = 87) = 14.08, p < .001. 
88 Chi-square (1, N = 17) = 1.47, p = .225. 






Use of Next Gen Mechanisms as a Function of the Defendant’s Identity 
 
 Industrial Defendant Municipal Defendant 
Settlements 70.1 29.9 
Permits 35.3 64.7 
 
 
Moreover, the defendant’s identity affected the specific tools that EPA used to enforce 
Next Gen, and it did so differently depending on whether EPA used its enforcement mechanism 
or its permitting mechanism. 89  For example, settlements with municipalities include 
transparency more than any other tool,90 while permits with municipalities include advanced 
monitoring more than any other tool.91  Settlements with industrial parties include advanced 
monitoring more than any other tool,92 while permits with industrial parties included 
transparency more than any other tool in our sample, although this did not reach statistical 
significance.93   
 
Figure 9 
Likelihood of Tool Usage by Type of Defendant (Settlements and Permits) 
 
                                                          
89 Wald (9, N = 520) = 286.77, p < .001 (interaction among the defendant’s identity, mechanism choice, and Next 
Gen tool).  
90 Wald (3, N = 130) = 326.87, p < .001 (main effect of tool usage).    
91 Wald (2, N = 55) = 180.10, p < .001 (main effect of tool usage). 
92 Wald (4, N = 305) = 54.74, p < .001 (main effect of tool usage). 
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Likelihood of Tool Usage by Type of Defendant (Settlements and Permits) 
 
 Advanced Innovative E-Report Transparency Built-In 
Settlements      
Industrial 48.3 13.5 3.4 23.6 11.2 
Municipal 42.9 2.9 5.7 48.6 0.0 
Permits      
Industrial 25.0 0.0 25.0 37.5 12.5 
Municipal 44.4 0.0 27.8 27.8 0.0 
  
 
 We investigated possible differences in use of mechanisms to advance Next Gen 
objectives based on the identity of the affected regulated part(ies) because a literature exists that 
suggests that, in at least some circumstances, EPA has, on occasion, treated municipal and 
industrial parties differently.94  For example, one scholar reported that, during the 1990s, EPA 
had a “prosecutorial habit of naming private, but not municipal,” entities as potentially 
                                                          
94 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Monitoring, Guidance on Bringing 
Enforcement Actions Against POTWs for Failure to Implement Pretreatment Programs (Aug. 4, 1988), 
https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0189.pdf (stating that EPA placed a high priority on assuring local 
pretreatment program implementation through enforcement against municipalities); Clifford Rechtschaffen, 
Deterrence v. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1227, 
1231 (1998) (finding that the great majority of municipal facilities violated the CWA without targeted enforcement); 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE & POLICY 932 (2d ed. 1996) (noting 
that EPA officials acknowledge they virtually never obtain economic benefits when they file enforcement actions 
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responsible parties in CERCLA enforcement actions.95  During that time, this “habit” “shift[ed] 
billions of dollars of cleanup responsibilities . . . [from] municipalities and impos[ed] their 
cleanup share on private parties.”96  Similarly, in describing a major municipal compliance 
initiative aimed at assisting municipalities with meeting CWA treatment requirements, EPA 
noted that it would prioritize enforcement actions against industrial violators.97  
  
While the qualifications we discuss in Part III highlight the importance of more thorough 
work to understand why EPA has used its mechanisms differently with respect to industrial and 
municipal regulated parties, our findings suggest that the identity of the regulated party may 
influence how EPA chooses and uses available legal mechanisms.  
 
Our final two sets of findings (Findings 7 and 8) explore two issues that are unique to use 
of the enforcement mechanism.  We call these intra-mechanism nuances.  Finding 7 explores 
EPA’s use of administrative versus judicial enforcement.  Finding 8 considers EPA’s inclusion in 
an enforcement settlement of a Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) and the impacts on 
mechanism choice and use. 
 
Finding 7.  Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1:  Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement 
Settlements.  EPA has a choice of pursuing alleged violators on its own through administrative 
enforcement or by collaborating with DOJ to pursue judicial enforcement.98  We investigated 
EPA’s use of each of these types of enforcement mechanisms and have three findings to report.   
 
a.  Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1: The Impact of Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement 
Settlements on Mechanism Choice.   
 
Of the 87 settlements we identified that include at least one Next Gen tool, EPA 
negotiated 31 on its own administratively (35.6%).  For the remaining 56 (64.3%), the agency 
worked with DOJ to negotiate a settlement.  This breakdown of administrative vs. judicial 
settlements that include Next Gen tools is very different from the overall distribution of EPA 
                                                          
95 Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 197, 252-253 (1988). 
96 Id. at 274.  Ferrey attributed EPA’s likely rationale for differential treatment of industrial and municipal liable 
parties to concern that municipal liability would  “translate directly into higher property tax levies.  As a result, 
current property taxpayers would indemnify PRP municipalities for past [environmental violations], raising 
intergenerational equity issues.  In some situations, this burden on the municipal fisc would spill over into requests 
for state assistance.” Id. 
97 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Municipal Policy and Strategy for Construction Grants, NPDES Permits, and 
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act, at 5 (1979), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P1005D0R.PDF?Dockey=P1005D0R.pdf; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy 
Guidance for FY 1980/1981, at 35 (1979), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/2000RWOH.PDF?Dockey=2000RWOH.pdf. 
98 See, e.g., Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs, 
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1367-68 (2000) (“The EPA thus has two quite independent enforcement regimes operating 
simultaneously.”).  Sanctions vary as well.  Compare 33 U.S.C.§ 1319(g)(6) (2012) (administrative penalties) with 
id. 1319(d) (civil judicial penalties).  EPA has multiple options administratively that run from the relatively 
informal, such as warning letters, to issuance of formal complaints seeking penalties and injunctive relief.  See, e.g., 
id. § 1319(g).  The contrast we consider in our case study is between administrative adjudication and civil judicial 
adjudication. 
98 See e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2011) 
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settlements.  Over the same time period (January 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017), EPA settled the 
vast majority of enforcement cases administratively—7,433 administrative settlements vs. 421 
judicial settlements. 99  Thus, including a Next Gen tool in a settlement was associated with what 
we term intra-mechanism choice – EPA’s use of administrative or judicial enforcement to 
resolve alleged violations. 
 
b.  Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1: The Impact of Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement 
Settlements on Tool Usage.   
 
We assessed whether EPA’s use of an administrative or a judicial settlement is associated 
with Next Gen tool use and detected a non-significant overall effect.100  Nonetheless, planned 
comparison testing revealed a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of the use of the 
transparency tool; specifically, it was much more likely to be included in settlements when the 
agency worked with DOJ than when EPA negotiated the settlement on its own.101  A similar 









                                                          
99  https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search/.  We ran the following search to determine the total 
number of administrative and judicial settlements during January 1, 2014-January 31, 2017.  Case Type: Civil; 
Case Category: Any; Case Lead: Federal EPA; Date Range: 1/1/2014-1/31/2017 (final order issued).  The Next 
Gen cases add up to 57 because 30 cases were removed from pre-2014 so the time frame would be comparable to 
the total number of EPA cases.  https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search/.  Of these 57, 22 cases 
were administrative and 35 were judicial.  Cf. Joseph J. Lisa, EPA Administrative Enforcement Actions: An 
Introduction to the Consolidates Rules of Practice, 24 TEMPLE JOURNAL OF SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. LAW 1, 2 
(2005) (noting that EPA is “substantially more likely to address violations . . . through an administrative 
proceeding than a civil action or criminal prosecution in federal court”). 
100 Wald (4, N = 435) = 5.34, p = .255. 
101 B = 0.74, SE = 0.30, Wald (1, N = 87) = 6.26, p = .012. 
102 In the Table accompanying this Figure (and in all tables in this Article), values with different superscripts are 























Next Gen Tool Usage as a Function of the Type of Proceeding 
  
Administrative Judicial 
Advanced Monitoring 67.7a 66.1a 
Innovative Enforcement 9.7b 17.9b 
E-Reporting 3.2b 7.1b 
Transparency 25.8b 53.6ac 
Compliance Built-In 16.1b 8.9b 
 
c.  Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1:  The Impact of Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement 
Settlements under Different Statutes  
 
 We found that EPA’s use of its administrative and judicial enforcement authorities varies 
significantly by statute.103  Specifically, while nearly all settlements under the CWA that include 
one or more Next Gen tools occurred with judicial enforcement, settlements under the CAA and 
RCRA were equally likely to be administrative or judicial enforcement.104    
 
Figure 11 





Differences in Use of Administrative and Judicial Settlements by Statute 
                                                          
103 Wald (2, N = 72) = 12.30, p = .002 (overall effect).  As we noted above, we excluded from our analysis all cases 
where we could not classify the governing statute as exclusively either the CAA, the CWA, or RCRA. 
104 B = 1.68, SE = 0.50, Wald (1, N = 72) = 11.42, p = .001 (comparison of judicial proceedings under CAA and 




























CAA 45.7a 54.3a 
CWA 3.7b 96.3c 
RCRA 50.0a 50.0a 
 
 
 Finding 8.   Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 2: The Impact of Supplemental 
Environmental Projects.  A final issue we investigated in our review of EPA settlements that 
include Next Gen tools involves the impact of EPA’s incorporation of a unique enforcement 
settlement technique known as a “supplemental environmental project.”  A SEP is a project that 
involves “beyond compliance” behavior that EPA sometimes includes in a settlement.  The 
government cannot mandate that an alleged violator undertake a SEP project.105  The carrot EPA 
offers to a settling party involves reduction in the payable penalty for the alleged infraction.106  
Differences in the use of SEPs in settlements that include one or more Next Gen tools represents 
a second type of intra-mechanism variation, in addition to distinctions between judicial civil and 
administrative enforcement.   
 
 a.  Intra-Mechanism nuance # 2 (SEPs) – Impacts on Intra-Mechanism Choice 
 
 The SEP technique was included in 27 of the 87 settlements in our database (31%).  A far 
greater percentage of Next Gen settlements include SEP projects than is the case for EPA’s 
settlements overall during the same time frame.107  
   
 b.  Intra-Mechanism nuance # 2 (SEPs) – Impacts on Tools Usage  
 
 We found a marginally significant effect in Next Gen tool variation as a function of the 
presence of a SEP.108  This marginal effect was driven by advanced monitoring and innovative 
enforcement, insofar as we observed advanced monitoring more often in settlements when a SEP 
was present, and we observed innovative enforcement less often when a SEP was present. 109  
 
                                                          
105 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) Policy: 2015 Update 1, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/sepupdatedpolicy15.pdf (“SEPs are projects or 
activities that go beyond what could legally be required in order for the defendant to return to compliance.”). 
106  Id. at 21. 
107 Our calculations indicate that SEPs were included in just 441 of the 9,493 non-Next Gen EPA case conclusions 
from 2013 through 2016, which is roughly 4.6%.  The difference in proportions of Next Gen settlements that 
included a SEP (31%) and non-Next Gen settlements that included a SEP (4.6%) was statistically significant, chi-
square (1, N = 9,580) = 129.20, p < .001.  Our calculation deserves a word of caution, however, because EPA’s 
archival database includes not only enforcement settlements, but enforcement “conclusions,” which we believe may 
include completed litigation as well.  We note, however, that the disparity between the proportion of Next Gen 
settlements that include SEPs and the proportion of non-Next Gen settlements that include SEPs is so vast, that it is 
highly likely that the disparity would remain statistically significant even if we could exclude completed litigation 
from the analysis. 
108 Wald (4, N = 435) = 8.76, p = .067 (interaction effect of the presence of SEP and Next Gen tool). 
109 For advanced monitoring, B = 0.64, SE = 0.32, Wald (1, N = 87) = 3.93, p = .048; for innovative enforcement, B 
= -0.95, SE = 0.49, Wald (1, N = 87) = 3.79. p = .052. 









Use of Next Gen Tools in Settlements with and without SEPs 
  
SEP Non-SEP 
Advanced Monitoring 81.5a 60.0b 
Innovative Enforcement 3.7d 20.0c 
E-Reporting 3.7d 6.7d 
Transparency 37.0bc 46.7b 
Compliance Built-In 11.1d 11.7d 
 
 c.  Intra-Mechanism nuance # 3 (SEPs) – Impacts Under Different Statutes  
 
 We also found a significant effect of the relevant statute on the likelihood of the 
settlement including the SEP technique.110  The overall effect was driven by a significant 
decrease in the likelihood of SEP usage under the CWA.111 
 
Figure 13 
Inclusion of SEP as a Function of Statute 
                                                          
110 Wald (2, N = 87) = 6.01, p = .049 (overall effect). 
111 B = -0.89, SE = 0.39, Wald (1, N = 87) = 5.36, p = .021 (SEP usage under CWA compared with CAA); B =  -.97, 



























Percentages of SEP Use by Statute 
  
SEP Non-SEP 
CAA 37.1a 62.9ad 
CWA 11.1b 88.9d 
RCRA 40.0a 60.0a 
 
d.  Intra-Mechanism nuance # 2 (SEPs) – The Relationship to Administrative vs. Judicial 
Settlements  
 
Finally, we evaluated whether the presence or absence of the SEP feature is related to the 
nature of the settlement (an administrative settlement negotiated by the EPA or a judicial 
settlement that involved DOJ).112  We found an effect of the mode of enforcement on the 
presence or absence of the SEP technique in the settlement.113  Specifically, a SEP was 
significantly more likely to be present when the mode of enforcement was administrative (that is, 




Inclusion of SEP as a Function of the Type of Proceeding 
 
                                                          
112 We investigated, but did not find, a statistically meaningful effect of the defendant’s identity on the presence or 
absence of a SEP.  B = -0.34, SE = 0.32, Wald (1, N = 87) = 1.11, p = .291. 





























Comparative Use of SEPS in Administrative and Judicial Settlements 
  
SEP Non-SEP 
Administrative 45.2a 54.8a 
Judicial 23.2b 76.8c 
 
Intra-mechanism nuances such as these have received relatively little attention in the 
literature on agency mechanism choice.  Thus, our findings that there is a relationship between 
the type of enforcement mechanism EPA used and several other variables offers a significant 
new direction for additional research to explore the reasons for the differences we uncovered.  
Several implications for agency mechanism choice follow from these results.  The following 
section explores those implications. 
 
III.  Provisional Assessments Regarding Factors that May Influence Mechanism Choice 
 
The traditional law review literature on mechanism choice focuses considerable attention 
on features of the legal mechanisms themselves as factors that might lead an agency to use one 
mechanism versus another to advance an objective.114  This Part explores six other factors that 
we believe may influence mechanism choices, using the findings in Part II to illustrate the 
potential importance of these factors on mechanism choice.115  The discussion elaborates on the 
ways in which the factors we identify extend well beyond the traditional literature’s typology of 
such factors and sheds light on how this kind of expanded analysis is capable of providing 
critical insights into how agencies do and should choose among available legal mechanisms. 
                                                          
114 See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of rulemaking and adjudication that may 
influence how agencies choose among those mechanisms). 


























A. The Possible Influence of Key Internal Actors 
 
One of our core hypotheses is that an agency’s choice of legal mechanisms (e.g., 
rulemaking, enforcement, or permitting) to advance an objective may be driven, at least in part, 
by the key internal actors involved in making such choices.  More specifically, we posit that the 
preferences and capacity of one key actor, OECA, may have influenced EPA to use one 
mechanism (enforcement) more than others (rulemaking and permitting) in its implementation of 
Next Gen.  We find a strong association between OECA’s key role in implementing Next Gen 
and that initiative’s emphasis on the use of enforcement to pursue its compliance enhancement 
and enforcement efficacy goals. 
 
 1. The Influence of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
 
 OECA’s central role in implementing Next Gen seems clear.  OECA was the “policy 
entrepreneur” for the development and roll-out of Next Gen.116  Without OECA’s leadership, it is 
unlikely that Next Gen would have been rolled out at all; and any rollout would likely have taken 
a different form and approach.  OECA not only conceived of and sponsored Next Gen; it also 
strongly advocated using enforcement to advance Next Gen strategies.117  For example, in a 2015 
memorandum in which she affirmed the prominent role she anticipated for EPA Headquarters in 
implementing Next Gen, OECA head Cynthia Giles indicated OECA’s intent to integrate Next 
Gen approaches pervasively into its enforcement caseload, rather than confine them to an 
ancillary feature of compliance promotion efforts.  She directed EPA to consider “Next Gen 
compliance tools” in all cases,118 and to include them “whenever appropriate in civil judicial and 
administrative settlements.”119  Another example of OECA’s commitment to promoting Next 
                                                          
116 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance and Permitting (June 11, 2015) (on file with the authors) 
(noting that Next Generation Compliance is “led by [OECA]”); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NEXT 
GENERATION COMPLIANCE: STRATEGIC PLAN 2014-2017, at 2 (2014), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/next-gen-compliance-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf 
[hereinafter NEXT GEN STRATEGIC PLAN] (noting that OECA has the lead for many Next Gen ideas and that it is 
“working across the agency to help assure coordinated implementation”).    
117 EPA listed as a key element of Next Gen “[d]evelop[ing] and us[ing] innovative enforcement approaches to 
achieve more widespread compliance.”  Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, FY 
2016-2017 National Program Manager Guidance 13-15 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
02/documents/oecas_draft_fy_2016-2017_national_program_manager_guidance_february_19_2.pdf [hereinafter 
2016-2017 OECA Guidance]; see also id. at 7 (discussing “greater use of fenceline monitoring and publication of 
pollution information, . . . advanced monitoring and electronic reporting in our enforcement investigations and 
settlements, . . . and self and third party certification tools, to help drive better compliance”). 
118 Memorandum from Cynthia Giles to Regional Counsels, etc., Use of Next Generation Compliance Tools in Civil 
Enforcement Settlements 1, 6 (Jan. 7, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Giles Memorandum], 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/memo-nextgen-useinenfsettlements.pdf.  
119 2015 Giles Memorandum, supra note 118, at 1.  The Memorandum lists four Next Gen compliance tools in 
particular:  advanced monitoring; independent third-party verification of a settling party’s compliance with 
settlement obligations (a variant of “innovative enforcement,” the fifth key element in Next Gen); electronic 
reporting; and public accountability through increased transparency of compliance data.  Giles explained that these 
tools, which involve “use of modern information technology,” would create an “effective structure for the settling 
party to comply with settlement requirements without increasing EPA’s oversight burden.”  Id.  See also Renee 
Schoof, Air Toxics, Hazardous Waste Top EPA Enforcement Priorities, 47 ENV’T REP. (BNA) S-62 (Jan. 15, 2016) 
(reporting Giles’ statement that EPA would increase would use of advanced monitoring).  Giles later issued another 
memorandum encouraging the use of Next Gen tools in SEPs.  Memorandum from Cynthia Giles to Regional 
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Gen through enforcement was its development of a Strategic Plan to integrate Next Gen into the 
agency’s compliance and enforcement program.120  OECA afforded less emphasis to rulemaking 
or permitting as a Next Gen implementation mechanism.121   
 
The results of our empirical evaluation of Next Gen’s implementation bear out these 
qualitative examples of OECA’s emphasis on enforcement as the principal mechanism for that 
initiative.  Finding 1 shows that EPA used enforcement far more than rulemaking or permitting 
to advance Next Gen.122  This emphasis on the enforcement mechanism may have several 
explanations.  For example, OECA has relatively greater influence over EPA’s enforcement 
agenda than over either rulemaking or permitting, which are conducted by other offices within 
EPA (or, in the case of permitting, by the states).123  For this reason, rulemaking and enforcement 
pose greater coordination challenges, both horizontal and vertical, for the agency than reliance 
on enforcement to promote Next Gen. 
 
EPA’s institutional structure is complex, as is the case for many federal agencies.  Its 
national Headquarters includes several offices, including the Office of the Administrator, several 
“program” offices that focus on specific EPA regulatory programs intended to protect different 
parts of the environment (e.g., the Office of Air and Radiation and the Office of Water), and 
various cross-cutting offices, including the general Counsel’s Office and OECA.124  
Responsibility for implementing regulatory initiatives is dispersed throughout EPA, with 
                                                          
Administrators, Issuance of the 2015 Update to the 1998 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Supplemental 
Environmental Projects Policy 1 (March 10, 2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
04/documents/sepupdatedpolicy15.pdf (noting that SEPs “are an important component of EPA’s enforcement 
program”).  In 2018, however, Giles’ successor withdrew the 2015 Giles Memorandum, stating that: 
there is no default expectation that “innovative enforcement” provisions will routinely be sought as 
injunctive relief, where such activities are not required by the applicable statute or regulation.  The 
determination to include these particular elements of injunctive relief (as with any other element of 
injunctive relief) is to be based on the particular facts and needs in a case. 
Susan Parker Bodine, The Appropriate Use of Compliance Tools in Civil Enforcement Settlements (April 3, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
04/documents/memoonappropriateuseofcompliancetoolsincivilenforcementsettlements.pdf.   
120 NEXT GEN STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 116, at 3-7.    
121 See also infra notes 122, 129 and accompanying text.  We do not want to overstate the point.  OECA also 
promoted the use of these other mechanisms to advance Next Gen goals.  See, e.g., NEXT GEN STRATEGIC PLAN, 
supra note 116, at 3 (discussing more effective regulations and permits). 
122 See supra § II B.1. 
123 OECA’s role is to “serve as the primary adviser to the Administrator in matters concerning enforcement, 
compliance assurance, and environmental-equity efforts.  It also provides the direction and review of all 
administrative, civil and criminal enforcement, and compliance monitoring and assurance activities.”  U.S. 
Government Manual, Environmental Protection Agency,  
https://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov/Agency.aspx?EntityId=nd3GrN5/DeY=&ParentEId=+klubNxgV0o=&ETyp
e=jY3M4CTKVHY.  OECA explains that it “goes after pollution problems . . . through vigorous civil and criminal 
enforcement. . . ,” and  that it “works with EPA regional offices, and in partnership with state and tribal governments 
. . . to enforce the nation’s environmental laws.”  About the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
(OECA): What We Do, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-enforcement-and-compliance-assurance-oeca. 
124 See EPA Organization Chart, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-organization-chart.  For discussion of the 
history of the development of EPA’s structure, see Alfred A. Marcus, EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54-Aut. L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).  EPA has changed its structure periodically.  See, e.g., David Markell, “Slack” in the 
Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 52 (2005).  
The current administration has contemplated further organizational changes.  See, e.g., OMB Reviewing Pruitt’s 
Plan to Replace EPA Regions with State Offices, InsideEPA.com (Dec. 15, 2017).   
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program offices having significant roles in the rulemaking realm in particular.125  Responsibility 
for permitting often radiates to regulators entirely outside Washington, as it is split between EPA 
regional offices and the states. 
 
OECA may have pushed less hard to include Next Gen approaches in rulemaking or 
permitting than in enforcement settlements because of its relative lack of control over the use of 
the former two mechanisms, whose use is determined by other environmental regulatory entities.  
The program offices within EPA’s Headquarters, which are responsible for rule issuance, and the 
regional offices and states where permitting activity occurs, thus had greater capacity than 
OECA to influence the use of those mechanisms.   
 
Public administration scholars have recognized that “[c]omplex innovations [such as 
Next Gen] require laying the social, technical, and intellectual groundwork acceptable to a wider 
spectrum of organizational units and members.”126  The diffusion of responsibility, and capacity, 
within EPA supports the suggestion of public administration scholars that successful 
implementation of Next Gen and similar initiatives requires significant groundwork to attract 
buy-in from an array of actors whose support and participation are indispensable but not 
guaranteed.  Champions of initiatives such as Next Gen are likely to need the cooperation and 
support of other key headquarters actors for the use of particular mechanisms.  As a result, 
mechanism choice and use may well depend in part on the relative buy-in, preferences, and 
capacity of different offices.127  It may have been more difficult for OECA to convince those 
responsible for issuing rules and permits to prioritize Next Gen and incorporate its tools into 
their actions than to infuse its own enforcement actions with Next Gen features. 
 
Finally, EPA’s policy offices, its regional offices, and state permitting officials may have 
felt less ownership over Next Gen, and a lesser degree of commitment to using their authorities 
to promote it, than OECA.  OECA would likely have garnered the lion’s share of plaudits for 
Next Gen’s success, even if the efforts of others were critical to that success.  One former OECA 
official told us that no one in the EPA program offices opposed Next Gen, but it was a matter of 
                                                          
125 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54-Aut. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 
(1991) (stating that most EPA rules originate in the national program offices).  EPA’s Headquarters participates in 
permitting and enforcement, and the Regions participate in rulemaking, so the text oversimplifies distribution of 
responsibility for use of these mechanisms. 
126 Fariborz Damanpour & Marguerite Schneider, Characteristics of Innovation and Innovation Adoption in Public 
Organizations: Assessing the Role of Managers, 19 J. OF PUB. ADM’N RESEARCH & THEORY 495, 503 (2008); see 
also Sergio Fernandez & Hal G. Rainey, Managing Successful Organizational Change in the Public Sector, 66 PUB. 
ADM’N REV. 168, 170 (2006) (“Managerial leaders must build internal support for change and reduce resistance to it 
through widespread participation in the change process and other means.”); Paul R. Verkuil, VALUING 
BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 144 (2017) (noting that, as a result of intentional 
fragmentation and overlap of agency authority, “collaboration is often the hardest thing to achieve”); cf. ACUS 
Recommendation 2012-5 (June 15, 2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Final-Recommendation-2012-5-
Improving-Agency-Coordination.pdf (suggesting “reforms aimed at improving coordination of regulatory 
policymaking”). 
 EPA’s David Hindin put it more simply:  “Any time you ask people to change you’re going to get some resistance 
to change.  That’s normal.  We expect it.”  EPA Official: ‘Next Generation Improving Compliance, 47 ENV’T REP. 
(BNA) 1742 (2016). 
127 See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 (2015) (“Organizational design 
choices can determine who controls the levers of influence . . . within an administrative agency.”) [hereinafter Nou, 
Coordination].   
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relative priority.  Next Gen was a high priority for the Associate Administrator for OECA, but 
not as high a priority for officials in other programs that focus on permitting and rulemaking.128  
Moreover, EPA developed neither specific plans to use permitting or rulemaking to advance 
Next Gen, nor specific metrics for evaluating the performance of the programs.129  Another 
OECA official explained that “the main reason there are no specific deliverables to include Next 
Gen features in permits in [agency guidance documents] is that we are in OECA and the permits 
are issued under the programs (air, water, waste).”130  The absence of overarching directives or 
oversight mechanisms may have weakened the incentives of governmental actors outside OECA 
to include Next Gen components in their rules or permits.131 
 
Assuming that horizontal and vertical coordination challenges face EPA in its efforts to 
integrate novel initiatives such as Next Gen into activities (rulemaking, permitting, and state 
enforcement) not directly within OECA’s control, EPA’s history, including past initiatives of 
EPA’s enforcement office, demonstrates that overcoming these challenges may not have been 
easy.  EPA’s compliance and enforcement officials and their counterparts in other offices, such 
as the programmatic offices, have not always seen eye to eye, which could have hampered the 
use of Next Gen tools in rulemaking.  As we have previously noted, some past EPA 
enforcement-related initiatives encountered significant pushback from other agency headquarters 
offices.132  EPA’s structure and past experience, in short, reflect that barriers to effective policy 
design and implementation resulting from internal substantive disagreements, capacity 
shortcomings, or coordination challenges may influence EPA’s mechanism choices.133  Rather 
than push recalcitrant offices responsible for rulemaking and permitting to pursue Next Gen 
strategies, OECA may have decided to rely on enforcement as the principal mechanism for 
implementing that initiative.  Even if OECA tried to induce those offices to foster Next Gen, 
their refusal or laggardly efforts to do so may have had the same results. 
 
 2. Horizontal Coordination Challenges 
 
                                                          
128 One former EPA enforcement official, Bernadette Rappold, stated that “[i]t’s not always clear to me how much 
the rank and file are committed to” Next Gen principles.  Former EPA Officials See Uncertain Future for ‘Next 
Generation’ Compliance, InsideEPA.com (Oct. 26, 2016) (also noting that a former Assistant Administrator for 
OECA characterized Next Gen’s future within the agency as “uncertain . . . because it is unclear whether a future 
EPA enforcement chief would support it”). 
129 Despite EPA’s active rulemaking docket, and its seeming commitment to use rules to advance Next Gen, an 
OECA guidance document for 2016-17 did not list any regulations it planned to develop to advance Next Gen’s 
objective of “[d]esign[ing] more effective regulations. . . , with a goal of improved compliance and environmental 
outcomes.”  2016-2017 OECA Guidance, supra note 117, at 13. 
130 Catherine Tunis e-mail to Katrina M. Miller (Sept. 12, 2016).  OECA served as the lead office for developing the 
NPDES e-reporting rule, which is unusual. 
131 Cf. Christopher Carmichael, Managing the Risk of Incentive Compensation at Financial Institutions, 36 BANKING 
& FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., January 2017, at 3, 5 (stating that “goals and evaluation metrics . . . have an impact on 
employee behavior”). 
132 See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 353-54; supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.  The problem is 
longstanding.  See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 380 (1985) (“Program and enforcement are in an uneasy equilibrium at headquarters.”). 
133 See, e.g., Holistic, supra note 19, at 34 (referring to “horizontal coordination challenges . . . within, between, and 
among agencies”); see generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
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EPA is not oblivious to these coordination challenges.  For example, it sought to address 
horizontal coordination obstacles by establishing a “default assumption” that one of OECA’s 
Next Gen tools, e-reporting, would be required in new regulations.134  One OECA official 
informed us that it conducted training on how to write effective rules using Next Gen principles 
and tools.135  OECA also worked with other EPA offices to promote aspects of Next Gen through 
greater reliance on advanced monitoring.136    
 
Yet another horizontal coordination challenge relates to the relationship between EPA 
and DOJ.  One might not spend much time considering the possible impact of DOJ involvement 
if DOJ typically served as a rubber stamp for EPA decisions.  But that is clearly not the case.  
DOJ takes seriously its independent role as the lawyers for the United States in judicial litigation, 
and feels free to develop its own positions.137  Thus, potential differences in priority and strategy 
between internal agency personnel and DOJ attorneys have the potential to slow, divert, or defeat 
agency enforcement initiatives.  Full-throttled DOJ support, on the other hand, has the potential 
to promote them.138  For purposes of our case study, the key question is whether DOJ’s 
involvement may affect whether and how EPA uses enforcement as a mechanism. 
 
Because DOJ supervises judicial enforcement litigation on environmental matters, its 
buy-in (or the lack thereof) is likely to influence whether Next Gen features find their way into 
judicial dispositions of court-approved settlements.  We found that more than 60 percent of the 
enforcement settlements that contained Next Gen features were negotiated through a judicial 
consent decree with DOJ involvement.139  Thus, DOJ played a significant role in the use of 
enforcement to implement Next Gen.  In contrast, DOJ’s involvement in settlements more 
generally is far more limited.  For example, the vast majority of EPA settlements during the same 
                                                          
134 NEXT GEN STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 116, at 6; see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Electronic Reporting Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,064, 64,070 (Oct. 22, 2015). 
135 David Hindin e-mail to Dave Markell (July 20, 2015) (on file with the authors). 
136 Id.; see also 2016-2017 OECA Guidance, supra note 117, at 15 (instructing EPA Regions to “[i]nclude Next 
Generation Compliance principles, tools, and approaches when issuing permits, reviewing permits, and training 
permit writers”). 
137 John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: Process, Actors, and Trends, 18-
Spg. NAT. RESOURCES  & ENV’T 10, 13 (2004) (quoting 6 U.S. OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 47, 54 (1982)) (noting that 
DOJ exercises an independent role and that its Environment and Natural Resources Division considers 
“[e]nvironmental enforcement [to be] one of [its] core responsibilities.”); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, 
Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1060-61 (2011).  For discussion of the sometimes less than 
salutary impact of control of litigation by DOJ on the programs of agencies such as EPA, see generally Herz & 
Devins, supra note 98; Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of 
Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558 (2003). 
138 See Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of Local Air Pollution 
Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 227 (1993).  For other work on horizontal relationships among agencies, see 
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency 
Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1454 (2014); Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, 
Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 19 (2014).  See also David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 
N.C. L. REV. 1, 8 (2014) (citing Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works Better than Weak 
Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (2013)) 
(describing “what can be accomplished when a regulatory agency and [the Department of Justice] are willing to 
devote substantial resources to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement initiative”).  
139 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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time period were resolved administratively.140  One explanation for the relatively high rate of 
DOJ participation in Next Gen settlements might be the additional seriousness of litigation if it is 
being pursued judicially rather than administratively.  Pursuing a case in court might give EPA 
additional leverage to procure a settlement, and the agency may have believed that such leverage 
would be helpful.  The difference in maximum penalty amounts is a prominent example.141  In 
addition, the types of cases most suitable for judicial settlement may also be most suitable for 
Next Gen.  EPA may have decided that the circumstances in which Next Gen tools are most 
needed should be pursued in court not only because of the higher penalties available, but also 
because judicial settlements may attract more publicity than administrative settlements, creating 
a more effective general deterrent.142 
 
Notwithstanding the higher percentage of settlements with Next Gen features that 
resulted from judicial proceedings, at least according to one source, “DOJ has never adopted the 
Next Generation model as an authoritative guide on how to conduct prosecutions, instead 
considering its principles as one set of factors among many that play into any case.”143  
Accordingly, EPA and DOJ may diverge on the extent to which they prioritize the Next Gen 
initiative generally, or particular Next Gen tools.  This appears to be at least a possibility.  For 
example, Finding 7, which relates to intra-mechanism choices involving enforcement, explores 
the extent to which DOJ’s involvement in enforcement settlements affected the mix of Next Gen 
tools incorporated into those settlements.  We found, for example, that the transparency tool was 
more likely to be incorporated into a settlement involving DOJ than in an administrative 
settlement negotiated by EPA alone.  This large disparity was missing for the other Next Gen 
tools, and for two (advanced monitoring and compliance built in), administrative settlements 
were more likely to include them than judicial settlements.  These disparate results may be due to 
differences in the two agencies’ views over the likely effectiveness or legality of the various 
Next Gen tools.144 
 
Our point here is not to provide a comprehensive set of explanations for the impacts of 
DOJ participation on Next Gen settlements.  Rather, we believe that the value of our findings is 
to highlight the potential significance of horizontal coordination challenges between federal 
agencies on mechanism choice and to urge further research into how different pieces of the 
administrative state may influence how agencies make those choices.    
 
 3. Vertical Coordination Challenges 
 
Successful integration of Next Gen components into the enforcement and compliance 
promotion efforts of EPA and its state partners also depended on vertical coordination.  The 
allocation of authority between national and more dispersed offices of an agency also may have a 
                                                          
140 See id. 
141 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
142 Cf. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 873, 888–89 (1997) (noting that companies regulated by the Food and Drug Administration may prefer 
voluntary product recalls to litigation over regulatory because recalls allow them “to exercise greater control over 
the nature and extent of public notification regarding any hazards associated with their particular product”). 
143 DOJ, EPA Enforcement Efforts Face Uncertain Future In Trump Administration, ENVTL POL’Y ALERT, 
www.InsideEPA.com, Nov. 23, 2016, at 31, 32. 
144 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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significant impact on mechanism choice, as the role of EPA regional officials demonstrates.145  
EPA operates ten regional offices, from Boston (Region 1) to Seattle (Region 10).146  These 
offices have primary responsibility for negotiating many enforcement settlements and for issuing 
many permits, with varying degrees of Headquarters guidance and oversight.147  Regional offices 
may have a more significant influence on mechanism choice than one might expect because of 
regional autonomy, lack of coordination, and related factors.148  They may have different 
mechanism choice preferences than the agency’s Washington offices or than Next Gen’s 
principal entrepreneur, OECA.  The critical point here is that, far from marching in lockstep, 
EPA Regions often march to their own drummers to a considerable degree, despite Headquarters 
efforts to promote national consistency.  Finding 5 reflects the influence that the division of 
authority between EPA Headquarters and its regional offices may have on mechanism choice. 
 
Thus, regional buy-in (which strong support from an agency’s national office may 
engender) is essential to effective implementation of initiatives, such as Next Gen, that an agency 
seeks to implement through multiple legal mechanisms, some of which are administered 
primarily outside its national offices.  Broad-based regional integration is especially important if 
an important agency goal is to maintain a level playing field throughout the country, as it is with 
EPA.149  These vertical coordination challenges may hold considerable explanatory value for our 
findings of regional differences in Next Gen’s development and implementation.  Regional 
variation was too weak in our findings, however, to provide the basis for strong findings about 
the impact that particular Regions may have had in determining Next Gen mechanism choices.  
Further research could help determine the extent to which mechanism choice is affected by 
regional office actions and decisions generally, and whether particular EPA Regions prefer 
particular Next Gen tools in particular.  If so, such variations would suggest the importance of 
close attention to key actors as possible influences on mechanism choice in a variety of other 
settings.150 
 
Although this analysis provides insights into the possible explanations for the 
predominance of enforcement settlements as a mechanism for implementing Next Gen, we 
                                                          
145 On the roles and influence of regional offices of federal agencies, see generally Dave Owen, Regional Federal 
Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016).  See also David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L. REV. 
727 (2018) (discussing the federalism and separation of powers implications of decentralization of federal agency 
decisionmaking). 
146 EPA Organizational Chart, supra note 124. 
147 GAO-13-115, supra note 19, at 4 (“[M]ost of EPA’s enforcement responsibilities are carried out by its 10 
regional offices.”). 
148 See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 354-55 (discussing “the considerable autonomy that the ten regional offices have 
traditionally enjoyed” and the struggles that agency Headquarters have experienced in “provid[ing] direction that the 
regional offices are able and willing to follow”). 
149 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by 
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 598 (2008) 
(noting that one justification for federal environmental law “emphasizes the need for uniform standards”); Richard 
E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and Preemption of State Remedies in Collective Action 
Perspective, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 919, 932 (2009) (“A common justification for federal regulation is the need 
for uniformity, particularly as a means of removing obstructions to interstate commerce.”). 
150 The lack of data on state permitting and enforcement decisions prevented us from exploring the extent to which 
vertical coordination challenges between EPA and state permit issuers and enforcement officials affected Next Gen 
mechanism choices. 
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hesitate to draw too many inferences from the data reflected in Finding 1.  As indicated above,151 
we have little data about the extent to which Next Gen features were built into permits issued by 
EPA Regions or the states during the period of our study.  These data limitations hinder our 
ability to understand whether the relative paucity of the use of permitting as a vehicle for 
advancing Next Gen goals is due to factors such as lack of opportunity on the part of OECA, a 
conclusion by OECA officials that enforcement settlements would be more effective at achieving 
Next Gen goals, or a lack of understanding of or incentive to promote Next Gen by permit 
issuers.  It would therefore be worthwhile to develop additional information (beyond the data in 
Finding 1) to learn more about the possible impact of vertical coordination challenges such as 
those facing EPA on mechanism choice.152  More work is needed to unpack the relationship (if 
any) between OECA’s motivation and capacity and the actual use of different mechanisms. 
 
In short, we assume that traditional explanations for mechanism choice may have 
influenced EPA’s choice of mechanisms to advance Next Gen.  But our findings suggest that 
other variables we identify as salient for agency mechanism choice, including the mix of actors 
charged with implementing a regulatory regime, may also have played a role.  In particular, some 
combination of OECA’s role as the policy entrepreneur in designing and implementing Next 
Gen, its greater control and influence over enforcement than over permitting and rulemaking, 
and horizontal and vertical coordination issues, all may have influenced EPA’s mechanism 
choice by contributing to its use of enforcement to a greater extent than one might expect based 
solely on the conventional typologies of factors that the literature identifies as critical to agency 
mechanism choice.153   
 
If this hypothesis is correct, it casts doubt about the comprehensiveness of traditional 
explanations for mechanism choice and, instead, suggests that a more expansive lens such as the 
one we provide here is needed to understand why agencies choose the mechanisms they do.154 
Our findings suggest many opportunities for more in-depth research into several questions 
relating to the impact of OECA’s key role and associated horizontal and vertical coordination 
challenges on Next Gen’s development and implementation.  These include:  (1) the extent to 
which one or more of the six factors we identify may have influenced the total number of Next 
Gen instruments; (2) whether these factors have influenced the relative use of the different types 
of instruments; and (3) the extent to which one or more of these factors may have influenced 
how such mechanisms were used.  Greater insights concerning these issues may help to equip 
policymakers to devise strategies that will help to improve internal operations to ameliorate 
performance shortcomings and increase the chances of achieving programmatic goals.  For our 
purposes, the key point is that the facts we have adduced, and additional information of the types 
we have identified, all suggest that mechanism choice may well be influenced by more than the 
factors highlighted in the traditional law review literature. 
                                                          
151 See supra note 37 (reviewing some of the limitations in our data set that complicate efforts to assess the extent of 
and impact of the use of different mechanisms). 
152 The inherent differences among the mechanisms, which has been the traditional focus of at least the law review 
literature on mechanism choice, is undoubtedly also a relevant factor. 
153 Cf. Nou, supra note 127, at 428, 429 (suggesting that adjudication has waned as a policymaking vehicle). 
154 Our focus here on the influence of actors simply illustrates the manner in which that factor may influence 
mechanism choice and is not meant to exclude the possible salience of other factors reflected in Figure 1.  We 
evaluate the potential role of these other factors on the relative frequency of enforcement as a mechanism to promote 
Next Gen tools in the remainder of this Part. 




B. The Possible Influence of Agency Policy Objectives 
 
A second influence on mechanism choice that extends beyond the traditional focus on the 
characteristics of the mechanisms themselves is the relationship between an agency’s policy 
goals and its choice of strategies to achieve them.  EPA has identified five objectives (or tools) in 
its Next Gen initiative that it hopes will improve compliance with the environmental laws.155  
These include the use of advanced monitoring technologies such as fenceline monitoring; new 
information distribution technology such as e-reporting; enhanced transparency measures such as 
public notification via agency or regulated party-hosted websites; improved rules that facilitate 
compliance (rules with “compliance built in”); and innovative enforcement approaches such as 
third-party monitoring.  If EPA used a different mix of legal mechanisms to promote these 
objectives (e.g., using rulemaking to promote electronic reporting but permitting to promote 
advanced monitoring), it would support devoting more attention in future research and analysis 
of mechanisms choice to the relationship between an agency’s pursuit of policy objectives and 
the mechanisms it chooses to achieve them. 
 
We found that EPA’s use of different Next Gen tools indeed varies significantly by 
mechanism.  As we indicated in our description of Finding 3, we found a statistically significant 
interaction between the type of legal mechanisms and the likelihood of specific tool usage.156  
For example, EPA was significantly more likely to use advanced monitoring and transparency in 
enforcement settlements than any of the other Next Gen tools.157  Advanced monitoring, 
transparency, and e-reporting appeared more frequently in permits than innovative enforcement 
or “compliance built in.”158  EPA resorted to advanced monitoring and innovative enforcement 
less frequently than the other Next Gen tools in regulations.159 
 
What might account for differential use of tools according to the mechanism chosen to 
achieve Next Gen’s effort to strengthen the impact of enforcement and bolster compliance rates?  
We posit that several factors may be responsible for the differential association between Next 
Gen tools and the mechanism chosen to employ them.160  The first is what we might call “fit.”  
The notion of fostering “compliance built in” is to create a regulatory regime that avoids the need 
for enforcement by facilitating regulated entities’ ability to understand and comply with their 
regulatory obligations.  It would make little sense to prioritize the use of that tool in enforcement 
settlements because by that time, the enforcement process has run its course.  The use of this tool 
in regulations and permits makes much more sense. 
  
                                                          
155 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra § II B.3. 
157 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
160 Some of these factors overlap with the considerations associated with the more traditional analysis of agency 
mechanism choice.  See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (identifying circumstances in which 
agencies may prefer to adopt policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking, including lack of experience in 
dealing with a problem or the specialized nature of the problem); Unraveling, supra note 1, at 343-46 (listing and 
discussing factors frequently thought to bear on agency mechanism choice). 
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 A second set of factors might be affordability (to regulated entities and the government) 
and cost-effectiveness.  It may be that the cost-benefit ratio for use of a tool such as advanced 
monitoring is likely to differ dramatically, certainly from industry to industry, but even among 
firms within a single industry.  If so, an agency might decide to rely on that tool selectively in 
permits for which the net payoff is likely to be greatest.  A related concern is the practicality of 
using a particular tool.  The technology to use an advanced monitoring technique may be farther 
along for one category of plants, or one environmental medium, than for another, and the 
capacity of individual regulated entities to use that technique may differ.  Those kinds of 
differences may suggest pursuing an incremental approach through permits and settlements until 
the agency is convinced that a tool has been used sufficiently to justify requiring it on a broader 
scale through regulations. 
 
Concerns about the scope of an agency’s authority to pursue a particular goal, or require 
the use of a particular tool, also may affect mechanism choice.  Sometimes, agencies are 
confident in their legal authority to pursue use of a particular tool in a particular context, while in 
others they anticipate legal challenges to the use of a tool by regulated entities and others outside 
the agency.161  Industry has raised concerns about EPA’s authority to incorporate third-party 
verification (as a form of innovative enforcement) and electronic reporting into its regulatory 
programs for underground storage tanks.162  To the extent that EPA is concerned about whether it 
has the authority to use a particular Next Gen tool, it may prefer to test that authority in the 
context of a select group of settlements or permits rather than through the crucible of across-the-
board regulations.   
 
Yet another factor is stakeholder interest.  Transparency, for example, may have many 
positive payoffs from the perspective of the agency and community groups and non-
governmental organizations.  But it also might create greater exposure to third-party suits that 
concern regulated parties.  That possibility may make regulated parties reluctant to agree to 
incorporation of a transparency requirement in a negotiated settlement.  Regulated entities may 
have less leverage to block the use of that tool in a permit.  Our findings, however, reflect 
relatively frequent use of transparency in both permits and settlements. 
 
We do not seek here to provide definitive explanations of the impact of the constellation 
of factors discussed above on our findings concerning EPA’s Next Gen mechanism choices.  Our 
goal is simply to suggest expanding the traditional analytical lens by investigating the influence 
of these and other factors on mechanism choice. 
 
C.  The Possible Influence of the Interaction of Statutory Authority and 
Mechanism Choice   
 
In our empirical investigation, we sought to use a statutory lens in evaluating EPA’s use 
of different legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools and objectives.  Finding 4 reflects our 
conclusion that an interaction exists between the mechanism used and the governing statute.163  
                                                          
161 An environmental public interest group might object to third-party certification as a form of innovative 
enforcement oversight if regulate entities were free to choose the certifying entity. 
162 See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 382. 
163 See supra § II B.4. 
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In other words, EPA used the available legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools differently 
under the three regulatory statutes (the CAA, CWA, and RCRA) that provide the legal landscape 
for Next Gen’s development and implementation.  For example, we found that EPA included 
Next Gen tools more frequently in settlements resolving alleged violations of the CAA than in 
regulations or, especially, permits.164  EPA used permits much more frequently as a Next Gen 
implementation mechanism under the CWA, and it used rules more frequently under RCRA than 
it did under the CAA.165  We also considered whether the mix of Next Gen Tools differed under 
the three statutes.  We again found that it did.  For example, EPA used e-reporting in a lower 
percentage of CAA settlements than RCRA settlements.166  EPA aimed at achieving “compliance 
built in” less frequently in CWA rules than rules promulgated under the CAA or RCRA.167 
 
Each of these two sets of findings supports our hypothesis that multiple factors beyond 
traditional explanations – in this case, differences in statutory authority or the manner in which 
an agency uses it – have influenced EPA’s mechanism choices and is likely to do so more 
generally.  An obvious direction for further research to account for the differences identified in 
Finding 4 is to pursue the possibility that differences in EPA’s statutory authority under the three 
statutes might help to explain why EPA has used the mechanisms so differently. 
 
The most obvious reason why EPA’s use of Next Gen Tools may differ by statute is the 
existence of a statutory mandate to use one or more of those tools or a statutory prohibition on 
doing so.  A rule that EPA adopted in 2016 under the Formaldehyde Standards for Composite 
Wood Products Act, enacted in 2010 as an amendment to the Toxic Substances Control Act, 168 
requires third-party monitoring.169  In this case, the impetus for imposition of this Next Gen tool 
by rule originated with Congress, which directed EPA to issue regulations that included use of a 
third-party testing and certification scheme.170  As EPA explained in the preamble to its proposed 
rule, the regulatory imposition of a third-party certification requirement is designed “to help 
ensure that regulated composite wood products consistently meet the TSCA Title VI 
formaldehyde emission standards.”171  Similarly, RCRA imposed a deadline on EPA to issue 
regulations establishing an electronic manifest system, a form of electronic reporting, for the 
management of hazardous waste.172  EPA issued these e-reporting regulations in 2014,173 and it 
has since issued supplemental regulations addressing issues such as the methodology for 
computing user fees.174  These statutory mandates may account for the agency’s greater reliance 
                                                          
164 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
168 Formaldehyde Standards for Composite Wood Products Act, Pub. L. No. 111-196, 124 Stat. 1359 (2010) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2697). 
169 Formaldehyde; Third-Party Certification Framework for the Formaldehyde Standards for Composite Wood 
Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,674 (Dec. 12, 2016) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 770.7). 
170 15 U.S.C. § 2697(d) (2012). 
171 Formaldehyde; Third-Party Certification Framework for the Formaldehyde Standards for Composite Wood 
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 34,796, 34,798 (June 10, 2013). 
172 42 U.S.C. § 6939g(b), (g)(1)(A) (2012). 
173 Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Manifest System; Electronic 
Manifests, 79 Fed. Reg. 7518 (Feb. 7, 2014). 
174 Hazardous Waste Management System; User Fees for the Electronic Hazardous Waste Manifest System and 
Amendments to Manifest Regulations, 83 Fed. Reg. 420 (Jan. 3, 2018). 
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on rules to implement an initiative such as Next Gen under RCRA than under other statutes 
lacking such mandates.175  The CAA also makes specific reference to a Next Gen tool.  It 
authorizes EPA to “require enhanced monitoring,” and to do so through the promulgation of 
rules .176  EPA has issued implementing regulations, requiring states, for example, to submit 
enhanced monitoring plans for ozone.177  Similar tool-specific mandates are missing from the 
CWA, which is perhaps part of the reason that EPA resorted to rules as a mechanism for 
requiring the use of Next Gen tools less frequently under the CWA than under the other two 
statutes.  Of course, if a statute mandates or prohibits the use of a particular regulatory approach, 
the agency lacks the authority to make any choices concerning that approach. 
 
The more common situation may involve situations in which an agency’s organic statute 
authorizes but does not require the use of a regulatory approach or tool.  An explicit reference to 
an approach or tool in that kind of discretionary delegation may make an agency more 
comfortable with and likely to use the tool, as it removes concerns about statutory authority that 
may otherwise create obstacles to an agency’s use of the tool or at least induce a cautionary 
mindset.178  Even if an agency’s organic statute does not refer to the particular form of a tool the 
agency wants to employ, its delegation may be couched in broad terms that are reasonably 
susceptible to a reading that provides the agency with sufficient authority to require the use of 
that tool by regulated entities.  Both the CAA and the CWA, for example, authorize EPA to 
require regulated entities to submit reports and engage in emissions or discharge monitoring, but 
they do not specify the appropriate forms of reporting (such as a e-reporting) or monitoring (such 
as advanced monitoring).179  Nor do they specify the legal mechanism EPA must use in 
exercising that authority.  As a result, this kind of delegation may not tell us much about why 
EPA chose to pursue an authorized Next Gen tool through one mechanism instead of another.  
EPA’s choice may have turned on factors such as the importance it attributed to using a 
particular tool and the agency’s perception of its suitability for its general application.  If EPA 
believed that third-party certification was a resource-saving oversight technique that was likely 
to provide reliable information regardless of context, for example, it might choose to establish 
certification programs by rule in a wide variety of contexts. 
 
Restrictions on the agency’s authority might also influence its mechanism choices.  The 
CWA, among other federal pollution control statutes, prohibits or restricts the disclosure by EPA 
of certain kinds of trade secrets and confidential business information.  It also imposes criminal 
sanctions on officials who violate those restrictions.180  Concern over running afoul of those 
restrictions might lead EPA to decide that a prudent approach to employing the transparency tool 
is to do so in individualized contexts such as issuance of permits or entry into enforcement 
                                                          
175 EPA issued both rules during the period of our study (January 1, 2013 through January 1, 2017). 
176 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (2012). 
177 40 C.F.R. § 58.10(a)(11).  That regulation was amended during our study period.  National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 65292, 65420-24 (Oct. 26, 2015). 
178 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing possible legal obstacles to Next Gen implementation). 
179 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2012) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2012) (CAA).  The statutes also 
provide a catchall grant of authority to require regulated entities to “provide such other information as [it] may 
reasonably require.”  33 U.S.C. § 1318(A)(v); 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(G).  Those kinds of provisions would appear 
to authorize innovative reporting or monitoring tools even if the general grant does not.  The CAA authorizes EPA 
to require submission of compliance certifications but does not refer to third-party certifications.  Id. § 7414(a)(3). 
180 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2012).  The Toxic Substances Control Act has elaborate provisions protecting confidential 
business information.  15 U.S.C.A. § 2013 (Supp. 2018). 
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settlements, rather than by issuance of rules, at least if EPA intends to rely on agency-created 
websites.  The more specific contextual use may allow EPA to craft transparency requirements 
for individual regulated entities that are less likely to prompt the disclosure of protected 
information than a generally applicable rule would do. 
 
Finally, the level of penalty assessments available to an agency may impact the degree to 
which it resorts to enforcement actions as a vehicle for requiring regulated entities to use Next 
Gen tools.  EPA may find enforcement to be a more attractive option under a statute with high 
statutory maximum penalties, but it may prefer permitting or rules if available penalties are 
lower.  These kinds of differences exist in the environmental statutes.181 
 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the mix of considerations that may influence why 
agencies choose one mechanism rather than another to pursue their goals or implement a 
particular kind of regulatory tool.  Further research into comparative mechanism choice under 
different statutes administered by the same agency is likely to shed more light on this factor. 
 
D. The Possible Influence of Regulated Entities 
 
 Another factor that tends not to be accounted for in the traditional law review literature is 
the influence on mechanism choice of the identity of the regulated entity that would be affected 
by the obligations an agency is seeking to impose through one or another mechanism.  We 
investigated possible differences in the use of mechanisms to advance Next Gen objectives based 
on the identity of the affected regulated party because it appears that, in at least some 
circumstances and on some occasions, EPA has treated municipal and industrial parties 
differently.182  For example, one scholar reported that, during the 1990s, EPA had a 
“prosecutorial habit of naming private, but not municipal,” entities as potentially responsible 
parties in CERCLA enforcement actions.183  During that time, this “habit” “shift[ed] billions of 
dollars of cleanup responsibilities . . . [from] municipalities and impos[ed] their cleanup share on 
private parties.”184  Similarly, in describing a major municipal compliance initiative aimed at 
                                                          
181 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (specifying a maximum CWA Class I administrative civil penalty of 
$10,000 per violation); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (capping RCRA civil penalties at $25,000 per day of 
noncompliance); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) ($25,000 per day cap under the CAA).  See also id. (setting total penalty 
cap under the CAA of $200,000); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (setting total penalty cap of $125,000 for Class II civil 
penalties under the CWA). 
182 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE & POLICY 932 (2d ed. 
1996) (noting that EPA officials acknowledge they virtually never obtain economic benefits when they file 
enforcement actions against municipal sewage treatment facilities); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence v. 
Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1227, 1231 (1998) 
(finding that the great majority of municipal facilities violated the CWA without targeted enforcement).  
183 Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 197, 252-253 (1988). 
184 Id. at 274.  Ferrey attributed EPA’s likely rationale for differential treatment of industrial and municipal 
potentially responsible parties to concern that municipal liability would “translate directly into higher property tax 
levies.  As a result, current property taxpayers would indemnify PRP municipalities for past [environmental 
violations], raising intergenerational equity issues.  In some situations, this burden on the municipal fisc would spill 
over into requests for state assistance.”  Id. 
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assisting municipalities with meeting CWA treatment requirements, EPA noted that it would 
prioritize enforcement actions against “major municipalities”185 and industrial violators.186  
 
The resource constraints facing municipalities continue to drive EPA’s differential 
treatment of governmental and corporate regulated entities today.  A 2012 CWA compliance 
initiative “emphasizes more flexible negotiations with municipalities that lack adequate 
resources and whose ratepayers are unable to finance upgrades and repairs to wastewater pipes 
and related collection systems.”187  As the Congressional Research Service put it, “[p]ressed by 
municipalities about the financial challenges that they face in addressing needs for wastewater 
and stormwater control projects,” EPA’s integrated permitting and planning policy seeks to 
“provide communities with flexibility to prioritize and sequence needed water infrastructure 
investments so that limited public dollars can be invested in ways that each municipality finds 
most valuable.”188  Thus, in at least some situations, EPA treats municipalities in enforcement-
related contexts differently from industrial regulated parties, with much more attention paid to 
issues such as capacity, affordability, and marginal benefit in the former context.  It may be more 
reluctant to pursue enforcement action against governmental entities and it may seek less 
onerous sanctions when it does. 
 
This analysis is consistent with aspects of Finding 6.189  We found that Next Gen 
enforcement settlements were more likely to involve industrial than municipal defendants.190  
We also found that the mix of Next Gen tools to which EPA resorted differed for the two 
categories of regulated entities.  EPA was more likely to impose transparency requirements on 
municipalities than industrial sources in enforcement settlements, but was slightly more likely to 
require advanced monitoring in settlements against industrial sources.  These discrepancies 
might be due to any number of factors, including the greater financial commitment that advanced 
monitoring may entail as compared to transparency requirements such as posting discharge or 
emission levels on a website. 
 
  By contending that features of the regulated party that have not been emphasized in 
the traditional literature may affect mechanism choice, we are not suggesting that traditional 
literatures lack possible explanatory power.   Instead, we are convinced that multiple factors, 
                                                          
185 Major municipalities are presumably generally more capable of absorbing noncompliance monetary sanctions 
than smaller local government units.  But cf. Ralph Blumenthal, Recalling New York at the Brink of Bankruptcy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/05/nyregion/recalling-new-york-at-the-brink-of-
bankruptcy.html (noting that New York City lawyers filed a bankruptcy petition in 1975). 
186 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Municipal Policy and Strategy for Construction Grants, NPDES Permits, and 
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act, at 5 (1979), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0010.pdf ;U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, Policy Guidance for FY 1980/1981, at 35 (1979), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/2000RWOH.PDF?Dockey=2000RWOH.pdf (prioritizing enforcement against 
major sources). 
187 Cities, Do Your Homework Before Negotiating Sewer Overflows: EPA, 48 ENV’T REP. 1192 (Dec. 1, 2017).  
188 Jonathan L. Ramseur, Congressional Research Service, EPA Policies Concerning Integrated Planning and 
Affordability of Water Infrastructure, 7-5700, at 3 (2017); see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Interim Clean Water 
Act Settlement Penalty Policy, at 17-20 (Mar. 1, 1995), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/cwapol.pdf (providing guidance on calculating penalties that 
was specific to municipal cases).  
189 See supra § II B.6. 
190 See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Table 7. 
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some traditional and some that are part of our expanded array of considerations, may help to 
account for mechanism choices.  Differential treatment of alleged violators based on a variety 
of factors is well-established in the enforcement realm,191 and not all of these are tied to the 
type of regulated party involved.  For example, the nature and extent of the violations is a 
relevant consideration, and both industrial and municipal defendants are capable of 
committing serious violations.192  The environmental significance of the violations is another 
potential influence that need not be correlated to the nature of the regulated entity.193  The 
extent to which a regulated party cooperates with an agency and addresses any violations in a 
timely way194 and historic compliance performance are additional relevant considerations.195  
Nevertheless, factors such as affordability are likely to influence whether and how the agency 
wields its enforcement powers, and it may be possible to generalize about the propensity of 
different categories of regulated entities (industrial vs. municipal; large vs. small 
businesses196) to be financially capable of meeting particular kinds of regulatory obligations.  
Our analysis of the differential treatment of industrial and municipal entities in connection 
with Next Gen’s implementation may provide insights into how the identity of regulated 
parties (which may involve differences other than this one) influences mechanism choice in 
other contexts. 
 
 E. The Possible Influence of the Differences Between Judicial and Administrative 
Enforcement 
 
 The discussion in this Part so far has focused on the factors that may induce agencies 
such as EPA to choose one mechanism (regulations, permits, or adjudicatory enforcement 
actions) instead of another.  Even if an agency has decided to rely on one of the three 
mechanisms, it may have options (what we call intra-mechanism choices) within a mechanism.  
The agencies that administer the CWA have the option, for example, of permitting by rule or on 
a case-by-case basis, and both EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers have relied heavily on 
regulatory (or general) permitting to administer both the National Pollutant Discharge 
                                                          
191 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2012) (authorizing federal courts to base the amount of civil penalty assessments 
on factors that include the defendant’s compliance history and on whether the defendant engaged in good faith 
efforts to comply). 
192 EPA has long considered the significance of violations in making enforcement decisions. See, e.g., Holistic, 
supra note 19, at 65-67; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, 
Memorandum: Revision of NPDES Significant Noncompliance (SNC) Criteria to Address Violations of Non-
Monthly Average Limits, Sept. 21, 1995, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/memorandum-revision-npdes-
significant-noncompliance-snc-criteria-address-violations-non; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 
FY 2016, at 62, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_ combined_v5.pdf 
(noting the agency’s intention to allocate resources to noncompliance having the most significant impact).      
193 See, e.g., Dynamic Governance, supra note 16, at 593-94; David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf 
of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1459 (2011) (“The EPA emphasizes 
cases involving significant harm in its policy regarding the exercise of investigative discretion.”). 
194 One example is EPA’s self-audit policy.  Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and 
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000).  Under this Policy, EPA may waive “gravity-based 
penalties for violations that are promptly disclosed and corrected . . . through voluntary audits or compliance 
management systems.”  Id. at 19,619.  
195 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (2012).  
196 Both Congress and federal agencies have long been inclined to treat small businesses preferentially.  See 
generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small 
Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 538 (1998). 
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Elimination System and dredge and fill permit programs, respectively.197 
 
 In our study, we addressed intra-mechanism choices in a different context – the 
pursuit of civil enforcement action through administrative or judicial proceedings.198  EPA 
under most of its organic statutes (including the CWA,199 the CAA,200 and RCRA201) has the 
option to pursue civil enforcement through either type of proceeding.  We sought to determine 
the extent to which EPA relied on administrative or judicial proceedings to impose on alleged 
violators the obligations relating to Next Gen tools.  Finding 7 reflects our findings that nearly 
65% of the enforcement settlements during the period we studied that include one or more 
Next Gen tool were settlements negotiated jointly with EPA and DOJ to resolve judicial 
proceedings.  This breakdown differed dramatically from the overall distribution of EPA 
settlements during the same period, which tilted overwhelmingly toward administrative 
settlements.202 
 
The reasons for this difference are unclear.  One possible explanation for the relatively 
greater use of judicial settlements in Next Gen cases is that EPA tends to bring more serious 
cases judicially.203  Thus, the nature of the violations may be a partial driver of EPA’s intra-
mechanism choice decisions.  In addition, cases involving relatively significant violations may 
be ripe for Next Gen treatment because innovative approaches (such as advanced monitoring or 
innovative enforcement approaches) may have the capacity to mitigate significant concerns that 
other, more traditional forms of relief would be less likely to address as effectively. 
 
A third possible explanation is that the government has more leverage to gain regulated 
party agreement to innovative injunctive relief in judicial cases because the sanctions are higher 
for civil judicial penalty cases than for administrative cases.204  EPA may tend to opt for judicial 
enforcement in cases in which it contemplates use of a Next Gen tool because of its perception 
that the active participation of DOJ may increase the government’s leverage and the willingness 
of enforcement targets to agree to creative approaches to resolve alleged violations.205  Other 
factors, such as differences in transaction costs and the prospect for adverse publicity, might also 
increase the government’s leverage in judicial cases. 
 
                                                          
197 See generally Biber & Ruhl, supra note 6. 
198 Criminal charges can only be brought in federal court by DOJ.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2012). 
199 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), (g). 
200 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3)-(4), (b), (d). 
201 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1). 
202 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
203 See Memorandum from Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Enforcement Principles and 
Priorities 5-6 (March 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1043731/download  (noting that judicial 
enforcement is one of many possible enforcement tools, that it is often used for relatively significant alleged 
violations when less formal approaches may not be appropriate, and that DOJ may return a referral to EPA if it 
determines that the matter “is more appropriately addressed through administrative, as opposed to judicial, 
enforcement”). 
204 Under the CWA, for example, civil judicial penalties may reach $25,000/day with no cap.  In contrast, the CWA 
imposes a cap of $125,000 or $250,000 for civil administrative penalties, depending on the type of administrative 
enforcement action.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), (g)(2).   
205 See McGarity, supra note 138, at 1206 (describing “what can be accomplished when a regulatory agency and 
DOJ are willing to devote substantial resources to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement initiative”). 
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On the other hand, several factors might influence EPA to prefer administrative 
enforcement as a mechanism to advance Next Gen tools.  These include EPA’s forfeiture to DOJ 
of ultimate control over the course of civil judicial enforcement, which does not occur in 
administrative proceedings.206  To provide one example, it is not completely clear that EPA and 
DOJ were in complete agreement about the use of SEPs as a component of settlement 
agreements.  DOJ’s concerns about the legality of SEPs, which include commitments to do 
things unconnected to the underlying violation, have been dismissed by EPA as “niggling.”207  In 
addition, EPA might prefer a more insulated forum in which to experiment with new approaches.     
 
We have offered some tentative explanations here for some of the intra-mechanism 
differences we detected. Ultimately, we believe that the value of our findings is to point the way 
towards more detailed analysis to understand the reasons for intra-mechanism differences of the 
kind we identified.  They provide a starting point for identification of the factors and motivations 
that may influence intra-mechanism choices such as whether to seek sanctions and other relief in 
administrative or judicial proceedings. 
 
F. The Possible Influence of Supplemental Environmental Projects 
 
As noted above, SEPs are vehicles for imposing on defendants in enforcement actions 
requirements that are otherwise not authorized by the statute allegedly violated, typically in 
return for a reduction in penalty assessments.208  Finding 8 explored several aspects of EPA’s use 
of SEPs.  We found that (1) settlements that required the use of one or more Next Gen tool 
included SEPs at a much higher rate than all of EPA’s settlements during the period covered by 
our study;209 (2) settlements with SEPs included advanced monitoring provisions more often than 
settlements without SEPs, but that settlements with SEPs included innovative enforcement 
provisions less often than settlements without SEPs;210 (3) a lower percentage of CWA Next Gen 
settlements included SEPs than settlements under the CAA or RCRA;211 and (4) EPA used SEPs 
more frequently in administrative than in judicial settlements.212  We do not have fully satisfying 
explanations for all of these findings.  Nevertheless, the tentative reasons we offer in this section 
may point the way toward further exploration of the drivers of intra-agency mechanism choices 
of the kind involved when EPA decides whether to include a SEP in a settlement. 
 
Given the relative paucity of SEPs in EPA settlements generally, why do SEPs appear in 
a higher percentage of Next Gen settlements than for settlements overall?  One possibility is that 
in at least some cases, EPA’s authority to demand the use of Next Gen tools as relief is not open 
                                                          
206 See U.S. DEP’T.  OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL §§ 5-12.100, 5-12.111 (2018) (noting that DOJ has responsibility 
for civil matters initiated on behalf of the United States for cases brought under the CWA, CAA, RCRA, and several 
other environmental statutes). 
207 Devins & Herz, supra note 137, at 589; cf. Cruden & Gelber, supra note 137, at 13 (stating that the Attorney 
General represents the entire Executive, not simply single agencies, implicitly acknowledging that interests may 
differ on that account). 
208 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 113 and accompanying text and Table 13. 
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and shut.213  Instead, by their nature these tools are innovative.  Because SEPs by definition 
commit a regulated party to undertake a “beyond compliance” project that might not otherwise 
be within the agency’s statutory authority, they may be a particularly attractive vehicle for 
resorting to Next Gen tools.  This dynamic may help explain why settlements with SEPs 
included advanced monitoring provisions more often than settlements without SEPs.    
 
Another question raised by Finding 8 is why the incidence of settlements that included 
SEPs differed by statute.  An obvious possibility relates to differences in the scope of statutory 
authority – EPA may have believed that some of its organic statutes authorize the use of 
particular Next Gen tools of the kind included in SEPs while others do not or may not do so.  For 
example, as we noted above, RCRA requires the use of electronic reporting and the CAA 
authorizes the use of advanced monitoring.214  The CWA is silent on both issues.  Alternatively, 
EPA may have deemed SEPs that include Next Gen tools less necessary or likely to be effective 
under some statutes than others because more traditional forms of relief were more likely to 
effectively address violations in one environmental medium than another.  For example, the 
monitoring technology is less well developed for water than air pollution, so the inclusion of a 
provision requiring advanced monitoring may have been less attractive to EPA in CWA 
settlements.215 
 
Why did SEPs appear in a higher percentage of administrative than judicial settlements?  
To some degree, we wonder about the relationship between this aspect of Finding 8 and Finding 
7, which found that EPA used judicial (rather than administrative) settlements relatively more 
frequently to incorporate Next Gen tools than it did for settlements overall.  This latter finding 
might make sense if EPA perceived judicial settlements to be a relatively more attractive vehicle 
to advance Next Gen goals, but Finding 8 appears to point in the opposite direction, at least with 
respect to settlements in which SEPs required the use of Next Gen tools. 
 
These findings may be reconcilable if skepticism about the legality of SEPs on DOJ’s 
part discouraged inclusion of SEPs in judicial settlements that are negotiated with the input of 
both agencies.  If EPA and a regulated party agree that a SEP that includes Next Gen tools is 
appropriate, it may make little sense for EPA to risk scuttling the deal by seeking the consent by 
DOJ that is necessary for judicial settlements.216  Moreover, if EPA prioritizes the use of Next 
Gen tools, the lower penalties that are often assessed in settlements that include SEPs may be 
less problematic for EPA than DOJ, which may value the favorable publicity associated with 
judicial settlements with high penalty assessments.  Thus, factors such as horizontal coordination 
challenges and the relative importance of monetary sanctions may have motivated EPA to prefer 
administrative to judicial enforcement as a vehicle for pursuing the use of Next Gen tools in 
settlements that include SEPs. 
                                                          
213 See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing industry opposition to the use of Next Gen tools in 
regulation of storage tanks). 
214 See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text. 
215 See, e.g., George Wyeth et al., The Impact of Citizen Environmental Science in the United States, 49 ENVTL. L. 
REP. __ (forthcoming 2019) (finding that citizen monitoring using advanced technologies is more prevalent for 
activities regulated under the CAA than the CWA). 
216 It is possible that differences in the nature or degree of public comment and judicial oversight also might have 
some explanatory value. 




Intra-mechanism nuances such as those associated with Findings 7 and 8 have received 
relatively little attention in the literature on agency mechanism choice.  Thus, our findings that 
there is a relationship between the type of enforcement mechanism EPA used and several other 
variables offers a significant new direction for additional research to explore the reasons for the 
differences we uncovered. 
 
V. Conclusion 
   
The nature and scope of an agency’s authority derives from its organic statute or statutes.  
These statutes not only provide the substantive mandates and directives which govern agency 
pursuit of statutory objectives.  They also define the legal mechanisms an agency is authorized to 
use to implementat the statute.  Three of the most important mechanisms for regulatory agencies 
are rulemaking, permitting, and enforcement.  An agency cannot develop policy through the 
issuance of rules if it lacks delegated rulemaking authority.217  It may only engage in 
administrative civil enforcement if its organic statute allows it to do so.218 
 
Frequently, Congress affords discretion to an agency to use more than one legal 
mechanism as a means of implementing its organic statute.  EPA has such discretion under each 
of the three organic statutes (the CWA, the CAA, and RCRA) upon which we have focused in 
this Article.  In those circumstances, an agency must make choices as to the mechanism or 
mechanisms that are most suited to achieving its goals in a particular context. 
 
Until fairly recently, the administrative law literature had relatively little to say about the 
inner workings of administrative agencies, tending to focus instead on the relationships between 
Congress and agencies and, to an even greater extent, on the relationship between agencies and 
the courts called upon to review the validity of their actions.  Although the literature on “internal 
administrative law” has mushroomed in recent years, one aspect of that component of 
administrative law – agency mechanism choice – remains relatively underexplored.  The existing 
literature on mechanism choice has for the most part focused on the inherent characteristics of 
mechanisms such as rulemaking and adjudication to explain what drives agencies to choose one 
or another. 
 
That kind of comparison is certainly valuable.  We are convinced that the decisionmaking 
calculus is considerably more complicated than that, however, and that a host of additional 
factors plays a part in agency mechanism choice.  We have identified several such factors – the 
key actors involved in statutory implementation, the agency’s objectives, the tools or strategies 
the agency has devised to accomplish its statutory mandates, and the mandates, discretionary 
authority, and constraints imposed by the agency’s organic statute provisions.219 
 
                                                          
217 Before the decision in Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 482 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
the prevailing assumption was that the FTC lacked the authority to issue substantive rules.  See GLICKSMAN & 
LEVY, supra note 1, at 270. 
218 Cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA’s Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REV. 549, 566 n.80 (1994) (“The 
legislature may delegate enforcement authority to administrative agencies of the executive branch so long as those 
delegated powers are controlled by adequate standards.”). 
219 See supra Figure 1. 
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In this Article, we have tested our hypothesis that these additional factors play a critical 
role in agency mechanism choice through an empirical investigation of an initiative by EPA to 
enhance its enforcement and compliance assurance programs.  As far as we are aware, this is the 
first attempt to provide extensive empirical analysis of agency mechanism choice.  Our findings 
appear to confirm the significance of each of the factors we have identified as potentially 
relevant, although in some cases we can only engage in informed speculation about how EPA 
weighed these factors in choosing the mechanisms with which it sought to implement different 
parts of its Next Gen agenda. 
 
We engaged in this effort not only to help understand the trajectory of Next Gen, but also 
to provide a template for further research – empirical and otherwise – into the expanded array of 
factors that prompt agency mechanism choices.  That research will be valuable not only to 
scholars exploring how and why agencies made discretionary mechanism choices, but also to 
policymakers in Congress and within the agencies themselves who seek to maximize the 
likelihood that agencies will have sufficient means to effectively promote the public interest in 
ways consistent with statutory delegations of authority. 
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